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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY REFORM IN 
THE ERA OF CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION 
DAVID W. CASE† 
ABSTRACT 
Congress constructed the entirety of the modern federal 
environmental regulatory system between 1970 and 1990.  However, 
due to ever increasing political polarization and gridlock, Congress has 
abdicated its responsibility as the primary national environmental 
policymaker over the past 25 years.  Since 1990, no major 
environmental legislation has been enacted, leading to a growing sense 
that the federal system has become stagnated and obsolescent.  Since 
the mid-1990s, concerns over the effectiveness, inefficiencies, and 
under-inclusiveness of the federal system have led to a robust reform 
movement seeking to build the “next generation” of environmental 
regulation.  Because of Congress’s inability to enact environmental 
legislation, however, such reform efforts have largely centered on 
numerous, primarily voluntary executive branch “reinvention” 
initiatives at EPA.  Congress’s failure to support these efforts, through 
legislation or otherwise, has severely undermined the ability of these 
efforts to achieve meaningful success, leading to a “lost generation” of 
environmental regulatory reform. This Article surveys the most widely 
promoted and analyzed of the “next generation” environmental 
regulatory reform proposals and calls on Congress to accept reform 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 1, 1970, President Richard M. Nixon signed the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 on national television, 
declaring that the 1970s would be the “decade of the environment.”2  
This event precipitated an explosion of legislative activity that 
ushered in the modern environmental regulatory era.  During the 
next two decades, from the signing of NEPA through the end of 1990, 
Congress enacted all of the major legislation constituting the United 
States modern federal environmental regulatory system.3  The vast 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4370h).  
 2. Richard N. L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 223, 227 (2011).  
 3. Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the 
Environment, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 97-98 (2001) [hereinafter Coglianese, Social Movements]; 
Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Nation’s Environment, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2323, 2328 (2014). 
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majority of these statutes were enacted between 1970 and 1977, with 
some new statutes and several major amendments to 1970s statutory 
programs enacted between 1980 and 1990.4  In the ensuing three 
decades, however, environmental lawmaking in Congress has come to 
a grinding halt.5  Congress has not passed any major environmental 
legislation since 1990,6 creating a “policymaking vacuum” that 
seriously impairs the vitality and effectiveness of the nation’s legal 
environmental protection framework.7 
This Article examines Congress’ wholesale abdication since 1990 
of its responsibility to improve, modernize, and reform a badly 
outdated federal environmental regulatory system.  Critical 
environmental protection problems that have challenged society since 
the mid-20th century have continued to flourish in the 25 years since 
Congress last enacted a major piece of environmental legislation.  
Policymakers have long sought effective and efficient ways to solve 
such problems, with particular emphasis on curbing the harmful 
impacts of corporate and industrial behavior.  Environmental 
protection became an enormously divisive political issue in the 
United States during the 1990s as policymakers stridently debated the 
effectiveness and efficiency of direct regulatory approaches in light of 
their tremendous associated costs.8  Since that time, the political 
consensus necessary for enactment of statutory authority for new or 
expanded mandatory regulatory programs to achieve desired 
environmental outcomes has been impossible to obtain.9 
Concern over the effectiveness and efficiency of traditional 
environmental regulatory strategies has encouraged considerable 
exploration of potentially viable alternative approaches, either as 
 
 4. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 97 & n.63.  
 5. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L. J. 1239, 1240–41 
(2014). 
 6. See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Principles in Environmental Reform, 23 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 253, 253 & n.3 (2013) (noting the enactment of a very few “minor 
environmental bills” since 1990 none of which made “significant changes to the nation’s primary 
pollution control or conservation statutes”).  
 7. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2324.  
 8. See David W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to 
Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 23–26 (2001) 
[hereinafter Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda] (describing specific environmental and political 
issues that divided policymakers in the 1990s).  
 9. See id.; RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 282–83 (2d ed. 2006) 
(finding that political conflict and distrust prevent policymakers from developing consensus on 
environmental issues). 
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substitutes for or as supplements to direct legal controls on corporate 
and industrial behavior.  Over the last two decades, substantial 
experimentation has taken place with alternative environmental 
regulatory reform programs in the United States.10  The primary focus 
was several reform or “reinvention” initiatives begun during the 
1990s by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
under the Clinton Administration.11  These efforts are viewed as 
having produced mixed and somewhat disappointing results.12  
Nonetheless, the public policy debate over strategies to improve the 
effectiveness of existing environmental regulatory systems continues, 
as does the search for innovative alternatives.13 
The increasing complexity and scale of environmental challenges 
provides even greater incentive to employ alternative strategies to 
improve and supplement traditional approaches to regulating 
corporate and industrial environmental behavior.14  The globalization 
of national economies has created wide-ranging environmental 
impacts throughout the world.15  The costs necessary to respond to the 
next generation of environmental challenges—especially climate 
change, biodiversity loss, non-point source water pollution, and 
myriad threats to vital ecosystems—will be enormous.16  In fact, the 
 
 10. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 40–46, 64–87 (reviewing several 
Clinton-era reform initiatives designed to experiment with alternative approaches to 
environmental regulation in the United States). 
 11. Id. at 3–4 & n.7, and sources cited therein. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 6, at 253–54 (“Major environmental policy reform is long 
overdue.”); CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA & DAVID J. SOUSA, AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: BEYOND GRIDLOCK x (2013) (“Despite congressional gridlock, 
environmental policymaking remains, and strong pressures for change play out along 
[alternative policymaking] pathways.”); Nicole Darnall & Stephen R. Sides, Assessing the 
Performance of Voluntary Environmental Programs, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 95, 97 (2008) (examining 
the promotion of voluntary environmental programs as alternative approaches to traditional 
environmental regulation); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management-Based Strategies: An 
Emerging Approach to Environmental Protection, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: 
MANAGEMENT BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 3 
(Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006) [hereinafter Coglianese & Nash, Management-
Based Strategies] (examining “management-based” regulatory strategies to encourage or 
mandate adoption of formalized environmental management systems to pursue environmental 
performance improvements not achievable solely through traditional regulatory approaches); 
LeRoy C. Paddock, Green Governance: Building the Competencies Necessary for Effective 
Environmental Management, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10609, 10609 (2008) (calling for reform in 
environmental governance by integrating alternative regulatory approaches into direct 
regulatory systems to control corporate environmental behavior). 
 14. Paddock, supra note 13, at 10609.  
 15. Id. at 10609–10.  
 16. Id. at 10610.  
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funding necessary to seriously tackle such problems will substantially 
dwarf that typically provided under traditional environmental 
regulatory programs in recent decades.17  For these reasons, it has 
long been imperative that Congress move to integrate the traditional 
direct approach of mandatory environmental regulation with various 
indirect measures for controlling corporate environmental behavior.18  
During the last three decades, however, instead of taking such action 
to improve and modernize the federal environmental regulatory 
system, Congress has done nothing. 
Section II of this Article surveys the construction of the existing 
environmental regulatory system by Congress, largely created during 
the era of bipartisanship that prevailed during the “environmental 
decade” of the 1970s.  Such bipartisanship in Congress on 
environmental issues sharply receded during the 1980s and 1990s, and 
in the present, is a long-forgotten memory amidst the current 
dysfunction and gridlock that prevails between the major political 
parties.  Section III examines the history of the “next generation” 
environmental reform movement that reached its peak in the mid to 
late-1990s, and which has declined considerably—although by no 
means disappeared—since the turn of the century. 
Section IV of this Article surveys the most widely promoted and 
analyzed of the “next generation” environmental regulatory reform 
proposals.  Section V examines the affect that congressional 
abdication of responsibility for the federal environmental regulatory 
system since 1990 has had on the efficacy of “next generation” reform 
efforts.  The lackluster results of these primarily executive-branch-
initiated efforts are directly attributable to Congress’ failure to 
support environmental policy reform through legislation or otherwise.  
Congress’ inaction has led to a “lost generation” of environmental 
regulatory reform over the past quarter of a century.  This Article 
concludes with a call for Congress to once again assume the primary 
role in environmental policymaking that it occupied forty years ago, 
and to accept reform advocates’ challenge to modernize a stagnated 




 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 10609–10; see also KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 310 (“The ambition to 
reconstruct environmental regulation along next generation lines remains vital, energized as it is 
by the well-known shortcomings of traditional approaches to regulation.”).  
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II. CREATING THE “FIRST GENERATION” OF THE FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: FROM BIPARTISANSHIP 
TO GRIDLOCK 
Congress’ entry into the field of environmental protection was 
gradual.  Environmental protection challenges in the United States 
proliferated with the growth of major population centers and 
industrialization in the latter part of the 19th century.19  By the mid-
20th century, Congress began to address threats to environmental 
quality and public health posed by urban and industrial pollution by 
enacting statutes encouraging state and local governments to pass 
regulatory laws to control such problems.20  The first such statute, the 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948,21 provided financial assistance 
to states for the creation of state water pollution control programs.22 
Congress increased federal involvement in environmental 
protection through a series of statutes enacted during the 1950s and 
1960s.  The Air Pollution Control Act of 195523 and the Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 195624 authorized additional 
financial and technical assistance to the states to control pollution.25  
The Clean Air Act of 1963,26 the Water Quality Act of 1965,27 the 
Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966,28 and the Air Quality Act of 
196729 created an expanded federal role in pollution control by 
authorizing federal research and issuing advisory standards.30  Despite 
the significant increase in federal legislation relating to pollution 
concerns, congressional policy continued to view direct regulation of 
urban and industrial pollution as primarily a state and local 
responsibility.31 
 
 19. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 90; see also ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 
111. 
 20. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 90–91 (7th ed. 2013). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
 22. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 20 at 90; Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2329; ANDREWS, supra 
note 9, at 205. 
 23. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). 
 24. Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat. 498 (1956).  
 25. PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 20, at 90–91. 
 26. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966).  
 29. Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).  
 30. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 96; ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 206–09. 
 31. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 90–91.  
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The federal “environmental law revolution,”32 undertaken by 
Congress during the 1970s, followed a dramatic increase in public 
concern for the environment over the preceding decade.33  Public 
environmentalism has roots in the conservationist and preservationist 
movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries,34 but the modern 
environmental movement did not truly emerge until the national 
social unrest of the 1960s.35  Events such as the publication in 1962 of 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring,36 which critiqued public health and 
environmental risks related to pesticide use, as well as the occurrence 
of major environmental disasters, such as the burning Cuyahoga 
River in Cleveland, Ohio and the massive Santa Barbara oil spill, 
energized public alarm over the perceived threats of industrial 
activities and pollution.37 
By the end of the 1960s, pollution concerns were at the forefront 
of public consciousness and environmental protection had become an 
important issue in national electoral politics.38  This increase in public 
concern, combined with a perception that state laws were ineffective 
in addressing interstate pollution problems, encouraged the sweeping 
changes in the federal regulatory role that occurred during the 
subsequent “environmental decade” of the 1970s.39  The conventional 
wisdom of the time was that Congress “had expansive authority to 
adopt any laws necessary and proper for addressing the health and 
welfare problems resulting from uncontrolled interstate pollution.”40 
 
 32. Aagaard, supra note 5, at 1240; see also Lynn E. Blais, The Legitimate Reach of the 
Environmental Revolution, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 14 (2014) (describing early 1970s 
federal environmental protection legislation as “mark[ing] a dramatic revolution in the role of 
the federal government with respect to environmental protection.”); Robert V. Percival, 
Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 164–
65 n.30 (describing the “revolutionary nature” of 1970s environmental protection legislation);  
Andrews, supra note 2, at 226 (noting that “[t]he EPA was created in the context of an 
extraordinary outburst of mass public pressure for federal action to address the widespread 
pollution problems that had resulted from the vast post-war growth in industrial production and 
mass consumption”). 
 33. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 91. 
 34. Id. at 89–90.  
 35. Id. at 91–92.  
 36. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).  
 37. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 91; RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE 
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58–59 (2004); Denis Binder, Perspectives on Forty Years of 
Environmental Law, 1 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 143, 143 (2012). 
 38. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 94–96; Andrews, supra note 2, at 226–
27.  
 39. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 95–96.  
 40. Blais, supra note 32, at 16 (observing that “in the early 1970s there were perceived to 
be virtually no . . . Commerce Clause restrictions on the scope of federal power to address 
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The signing of NEPA on New Year’s Day in 1970 mandated that 
federal governmental agencies begin considering environmental 
concerns when making decisions about major federal activities.41  The 
creation of EPA and the enactment of the Clean Air Act of 197042 
followed later that year.43  Over the next 10 years, Congress enacted 
more than a dozen additional major federal environmental regulatory 
programs, including the Clean Water Act of 1972,44 the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972,45 the Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act of 1972,46 the Endangered Species Act of 1973,47 the Safe 
Drinking Water Act of 1974,48 the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),49 the Toxic Substances Control Act of 
1976,50 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).51 
These programs dramatically transformed the federal role in 
regulating environmental pollution.52  Instead of primarily providing 
assistance to state and local governments, these statutes mandated a 
federal framework of national minimum pollution control standards, 
stringent regulation, permitting requirements, and enforcement.53  
Congress authorized EPA to oversee the creation, implementation, 
and enforcement of most of these federal regulatory mandates.54  
EPA then delegated the authority to administer and enforce certain 
federal standards to individual states.55  Within the federal framework 
that was created, state and local governments are permitted to 
establish pollution control standards that are more stringent, but not 
 
problems of national significance relating, however indirectly, to interstate commerce”). 
 41. Id.; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 92.  
 42. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–
7671q).  
 43. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra, note 3, at 96.  
 44. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387).  
 45. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–64).  
 46. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(a)–(y)). 
 47. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44).  
 48. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300f).  
 49. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–
6992k).  
 50. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–92).  
 51. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75).  
 52. See Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 96–99.  
 53. See Binder, supra note 37, at 152.  
 54. Andrews, supra note 2, at 224.  
 55. Id. at 231.   
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less so, than the federal minimum standards.56 
The “enormous expansion of federal authority over the 
environment” carried out by Congress during the 1970s “signified a 
transformation in American law that could be described as quasi-
constitutional in scope.”57  Enacting the basic statutory framework for 
environmental protection also signaled a remarkable swing in the 
influence in Congress previously enjoyed by politically and 
economically powerful industry interests opposed to environmental 
regulation.58  The creation of the federal environmental regulatory 
system in the face of the powerful political and economic barriers 
arrayed in opposition has been characterized as a “republican 
moment”—an ‘‘outburst of democratic participation and ideological 
politics . . . created by widespread and then-rising public demand for 
environmental protection.”59  Given the “radically redistributive 
nature” of this new system of federal environmental protection, 
Congress required a tremendous political consensus for its 
enactment.60  Indeed, the major environmental legislative programs 
enacted during this period were passed in Congress with broad 
bipartisan support reflected by “overwhelming majorities” and 
“lopsided votes.”61 
The demise of the era of bipartisan support for environmental 
protection began in earnest in the early 1980s.  In 1980, Republican 
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan’s campaign platform 
vigorously opposed a strong federal regulatory role in environmental 
protection.62  Following his election, the Reagan administration 
embarked on a major environmental deregulation strategy, seeking to 
dismantle existing statutory programs and drastically curtail federal 
 
 56. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 227–28; Binder, supra note 37, at 177.  
 57. Coglianese, Social Movements, supra note 3, at 97–98.  
 58. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 18–19 (describing the shift in 
political influence between business and industry interests and public interest groups due to the 
successes of the modern environmental movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s).  
 59. Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental Law, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 999 (2003) [hereinafter Lazarus] (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted).  
 60. Id. at 1000; Aagaard, supra note 5, at 1281.  
 61. Aagaard, supra note 5, at 1240, 1281–82; Lazarus, supra note 59, at 1001–03; Andrews, 
supra note 2, at 224; see also KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 19 (describing period of 
“remarkable bipartisanship on the environment” during the late 1960s and the 1970s). 
 62. Lazarus, supra note 59, at 1026; Daniel A. Farber, The Thirty Years War over Federal 
Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 413, 419 (2013) (reviewing THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO 
HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013)) [hereinafter Farber, 
Thirty Years War].  
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monitoring and enforcement capabilities.63  However, through a 
combination of political scandal, mismanagement by Reagan 
appointees at EPA, and significant public backlash against Reagan’s 
environmental policies, these efforts to either unmake or sharply 
constrain the environmental regulatory system created during the 
1970s were an abject failure.64 
Congress not only rejected the Reagan administration’s 
environmental deregulation initiatives, but further expanded and 
strengthened the federal environmental regulatory system during this 
period.65  Over the course of the following decade, Congress added 
several new major programs including the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986,66 the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990,67 and the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990.68  Further, Congress 
enacted comprehensive and progressively more prescriptive 
amendments to RCRA in 1984,69 to the Safe Drinking Water Act70 
and to CERCLA in 1986,71 to the Clean Water Act in 1987,72 and to 
 
 63. Lazarus, supra note 59, at 1026; Andrews, supra note 2, at 235–36; Case, Regulatory 
Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 21; see also Joel A. Mintz, Assessing National Environmental 
Enforcement: Some Lessons From the United States Experience, 26 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2013) (discussing early Reagan Administration efforts “to undermine—if not abolish 
entirely—the [EPA’s] enforcement program”).  
 64. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 21–23; Andrews, supra note 2, at 
236–37; see also Farber, Thirty Years War, supra note 62, at 419 (noting that Reagan “was able 
to accomplish little in terms of regulatory reform in Congress”).  
 65. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 22–23 (pointing to Congress’s 
passage of numerous command and control statutes between 1984 and 1994 as evidence that 
Congress rejected environmental deregulation); Lazarus, supra note 59, at 1028 (finding that 
federal environmental regulation was “reinvigorated” in the 1990s); Rena I. Steinzor, 
Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 
22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 107 (1998) [hereinafter Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation] 
(“Congress’s determination to establish a network of detailed regulatory requirements was 
motivated by a popular backlash against the Reagan administration’s environmental policies, in 
particular its stewardship of the EPA.”); James Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: 
Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980s, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 351–53 (1986) (finding that 
Congress was provoked into assuming a regulatory role by the Reagan administration’s 
deregulation agenda). 
 66. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50). 
 67. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 486 (1990) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
60).  
 68. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–09).  
 69. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901).  
 70. Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 201). 
 71. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601).  
 72. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 100 Stat. 7 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251). 
19_Case_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/14/2015  6:29 PM 
Fall 2014] THE LOST GENERATION 59 
the Clean Air Act in 1990.73  Nonetheless, the 1980s witnessed a 
serious and growing fracturing of 1970s-era bipartisan support for a 
strong federal role in environmental protection.74  The demise of 
bipartisan support was triggered in large part by the fallout from the 
Reagan administration’s failed deregulatory initiatives and anti-
environmental regulatory policies.75 
Federal environmental regulation became even more politically 
divisive in Congress during the 1990s.  Conservative Republican 
candidates in the 1994 congressional elections made reducing the 
scope and intensity of federal environmental regulations a 
cornerstone of their campaigns through their so-called “Contract with 
America.”76  After Republicans won a new congressional majority in 
the 1994 elections, they introduced a deluge of legislative proposals to 
weaken or eliminate major federal environmental programs and 
radically reduce environmental program and enforcement budgets.77  
However, similarly to the party’s efforts in the early 1980s, this effort 
to dismantle the federal environmental regulatory system also failed.  
Due in large part to widespread public criticism and opposition,78 the 
major environmental statutes survived this assault intact.79  
Nonetheless, “the excessively confrontational nature of the failed 
assault on the environmental regulatory system carried out during the 
104th Congress” intensely increased the partisan divide over these 
issues.80 
 
 73. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 7407); see Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation, supra note 65, at 107.  
 74. See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 259 (noting that the events surrounding the Regan 
administration’s early approach to environmental regulation triggered “a more bitter and far 
more partisan period of distrust and ideological trench warfare over environmental protection 
policy”); Andrews, supra note 2, at 224 (during the 1980s “among elected politicians and 
interest groups [environmental protection] became a surrogate for an increasing ideological and 
partisan conflict over the role of government regulation in achieving it”).  
 75. Id. 
 76. Andrews, supra note 2, at 244–45; Lazarus, supra note 59, at 1027; Case, Regulatory 
Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 24. 
 77. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 23–25; Zygmunt J.B. Plater, 
Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting Market Force-Dynamics 
in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733, 734–35 (1996).  
 78. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 25; see also Michael E. Kraft, 
Environmental Policy in Congress: Revolution, Reform, or Gridlock?, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY IN THE 1990S 119, 137 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 3d ed., 1997) (describing 
intense negative public reaction to Republican environmental agenda in the 104th Congress).  
 79. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 51.  
 80. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 25–26; see also KLYZA & SOUSA, 
supra note 13, at 21 (describing “bitter partisanship of the 1990s” regarding environmental 
policy).  
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Nearly three decades after the last significant environmental 
legislation was passed by Congress, federal environmental regulation 
continues to be an intensely divisive issue.81  Since the 1970s, the 
partisan divide between the two major political parties on 
environmental issues in Congress has grown exponentially more 
bitter and ideological.82  In the current highly politicized climate, 
environmental issues are little more than “a proxy for an ideological 
battle over the appropriate extent of federal regulatory authority.”83  
Similarly, EPA has become “a political lightening rod” and is often 
used as “a symbol of excessive and heavy handed regulation.”84 
Since the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 
Congress has been unable to agree on revisions or amendments to 
major environmental statutes, or to enact new statutes to address 
emerging environmental issues such as climate change.85  As Sandra 
Zellmer recently demonstrated, during the 1970s and 1980s, Congress 
routinely amended the major environmental statutes in response to 
judicial decisions from the Supreme Court and the federal courts of 
appeal “to insure that the agencies and the courts were staying true to 
[Congress’ legislative] purposes and implementation strategies.”86  
However, post-1990, Congress has wholly abdicated even this most 
basic responsibility of environmental policymaking.87 
Since 1990, a “legislative stalemate” has prevailed, and Congress 
 
 81. Aagaard, supra note 5, at 1281–82.  
 82. Lazarus, supra note 59, at 1019; see Andrews, supra note 2, at 225 (noting 
environmental protection has been “consigned to the status of a political football of partisan 
and ideological politics”); Aagaard, supra note 5, at 1282 (noting that “Democrats and 
Republicans have sharply diverged in their support for environmental protection”); Zellmer, 
supra note 3, at 2325 (noting the “bitterly partisan nature of environmental issues in Congress 
today”).  
 83. Aagaard, supra note 5, at 1282; see also Adler, supra note 6, at 256 (noting that 
“opposition to environmental regulation has become a litmus test in some quarters” and that 
“reflexive opposition to environmental policy proposals” often occurs); Andrews, supra note 2, 
at 238–39 (describing the “deep ideological fault line between support for environmental 
protection and hostility to the federal government” which “continues to stalemate 
environmental policy . . . more than a quarter century later”).  
 84. Aagaard, supra note 5, at 1275.  
 85. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 41, 86.  As Professors Klyza and Sousa note, “for 
decades, Congress has been in gridlock on environmental policymaking, achieving few new laws 
or significant revisions of old laws despite a raft of emerging environmental problems and deep, 
legitimate concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of the old statutes.”  Id. at xvii.  
 86. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2326; see also id. at 2328–40 (surveying amendments to major 
statutes in response to court decisions during the period from the late 1970s through the decade 
of the 1980s).  
 87. See id. at 2340–49 (“Since 1990, the federal agencies and the Supreme Court have 
eclipsed Congress in terms of environmental policymaking.”). 
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has been unable “to respond to demands from the left, the right, or 
the center for changes to the laws governing pollution, conservation, 
and natural resource policy.”88  Commentators characterize the 
current climate in Congress on environmental issues as 
“gridlocked,”89 “deadlock[ed],”90 “dysfunction[al],”91 “broken,”92 the 
subject of “considerable, self-imposed inertia,”93 and “highly 
inhospitable to the enactment of major environmental legislation.”94  
There are no signs from Congress that indicate the current gridlock 
over environmental policy will end within the foreseeable future.  In 
fact, the odds of enactment of any significant federal environmental 
legislation only seem to diminish with the installation of each new 
Congress.95 
Notwithstanding the now long-running era of extreme 
partisanship and politicization of environmental issues in Congress, 
the federal environmental regulatory system it constructed during 
earlier decades remains in place.96  Since the early 1970s, this system is 
credited with substantial, albeit insufficient, success in reducing 
pollution and improving environmental quality in many ways.97  
 
 88. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 10; see also Michael Ray Harris, Environmental 
Deliberative Democracy and the Search for Administrative Legitimacy: A Legal Positivism 
Approach, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 363 (2011) [hereinafter Harris] (“Today, most 
scholars accept that our nation’s environmental story has become a story of Congressional 
inaction . . . .”).  
 89. Michael B. Gerrard & Shelley Welton, US Federal Climate Change in Obama’s Second 
Term, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 111, 112 (2014); see also KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 31 
(noting that “[l]egislative gridlock is a feature of modern environmental policymaking”); 
Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2325, 2372, 2379; Andrews, supra note 2, at 225, 255; Sam Kalen, 
Dormancy Versus Innovation: A Next Generation Dormant Commerce Clause, 65 OKLA. L. 
REV. 381, 382 (2013) (noting that “[t]oday’s Congress” is dominated by “partisan gridlock” that 
is “unlikely to change anytime soon”).  
 90. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Policy and the United States System of Divided Powers: 
Dealing with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Leakage, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 31, 54 (2014).  
 91. Gerrard & Welton, supra note 89, at 112.  
 92. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2366, 2371.  
 93. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era 
of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354 (2011).  
 94. Aagaard, supra note 5, at 1282.  
 95. See also id. (observing that the impasse in Congress “shows no signs of abating; if 
anything, the prospects for significant new federal environmental legislation seem bleaker than 
ever”).  
 96. Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 675 (2003); 
Adler, supra note 6, at 253–54; Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2324.  
 97. See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 252–53 (describing the success of the national 
regulatory framework in reducing air, water, automobile and other emissions, but noting the 
limitations in achieving long-term solutions to pollution); Coglianese, Social Movements, supra 
note 3, at 98–99 (attributing significant drops of the levels of carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, 
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Mandatory regulation is said to have “picked the low-hanging fruit” 
of relatively discrete and easily targeted sources of harm, such as 
land-based waste disposal and large industrial “point sources” of 
pollution.98  “Systemic or lasting solutions” to the pollution control 
problems addressed by the federal regulatory system remain 
unrealized.99  Furthermore, many critical environmental protection 
problems—such as non-point source water and air pollution, 
emissions affecting climate change, wasteful consumption of natural 
resources and energy supplies, and risks posed by the manufacture 
and use of toxic chemicals—continue to flourish and are inadequately 
addressed by the current system.100  One of the strongest criticisms of 
the existing environmental regulatory system is its under-
inclusiveness in terms of both the types and sources of harms it 
regulates.101 
 
III. SEARCHING FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY 
SYSTEM’S “NEXT GENERATION” 
 
The legal environmental protection framework built by Congress 
during the environmental decade of the 1970s is often pejoratively 
referred to as “command-and-control.”102  Despite its ubiquity in 
 
and lead in the air, as well as water quality improvements, to the legislation and regulations 
imposed since the 1970s, but noting that there are still several environmental problems 
remaining);  see also Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, Environmental Policy from the 1970s to 
the 1990s: An Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 1, 23 (Norman J. Vig & 
Michael E. Kraft eds., 3d ed., 1997) (“As the data reviewed . . . suggest, the nation made 
impressive gains between 1970 and 1996 in controlling many conventional pollutants . . . .”). 
 98. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management - Is it Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH 21, 21 (2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as 
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 526 (2004); Cary 
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda, 
in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE 
POLICY GOALS 1, 1 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) [hereinafter Coglianese & 
Nash, Environmental Management Systems].  
 99. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 252.  
 100. Andrews, supra note 2, at 254; Ruhl, supra note 98, at 22;  Kraft & Vig, supra note 97, 
at 23;  J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JANICE MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 270–76 (1998). 
 101. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 28; Jesse Ratcliffe, Reinvisioning the 
Risk Bubble: Utilizing a System of Intra-Firm Risk Trading for Environmental Protection, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2004).  
 102. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 26–27 (explaining that the 
federal regulatory “command-and-control” system is a “top-down” form of regulation, because 
the federal government “commands” compliance with national, uniform standards); Steinzor, 
Reinventing Regulation, supra note 65, at 104 (identifying the command and control system as 
the basis for most rule-making that imposes complicated requirements in limits on industries); 
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academic literature, the phrase “command-and-control” has eluded 
precise definition and has evolved into shorthand for broad-based 
criticism of mandatory regulatory approaches to control corporate 
environmental behavior.103  Typically, “command-and-control” 
regulation in the environmental context is a top-down, hierarchical 
structure  within which the government mandates the means and 
methods of pollution control, usually through either uniform 
technology-based controls or performance standards enforced 
through a permitting system.104  More simply, the existing federal 
environmental regulatory framework creates “a model of direct 
regulatory proscription of unwanted individual and corporate 
behaviors through a series of regulatory commands of the ‘thou shalt 
not’ variety.”105  These “commandments” are “backed by stiff 
administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions for non-compliance, 
enforceable by administrative agencies, federal and state prosecutors, 
and sometimes ordinary aggrieved citizens through the mechanism of 
the citizen suit.”106 
This “first generation”107 of the federal environmental regulatory 
 
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at  270 (describing federal legislation as “command-and-control,” 
because EPA was directed to address environmental problems by setting standards, issuing 
permits, imposing fines, etc.). 
 103. See David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A 
Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 380 n.2 (2005) [hereinafter Case, 
Corporate Environmental Reporting] (“The phrase ‘command-and-control’ has taken on a life of 
its own in the environmental literature.  Despite its widespread use, there is significant 
disagreement regarding a precise definition of the phrase”); see also Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid 
Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 658–59 (2012) (“the term [command and 
control] is deployed routinely in articles that criticize regulation” and “although [it] has become 
widely used short-hand in contemporary legal circles, it is rarely defined and its meanings and 
functions have become either submerged or taken for granted”); Kathryn Harrison, Talking 
with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 
51, 53 (1999) [hereinafter Harrison, Talking with the Donkey] (noting that “command and 
control” is commonly overused as a “pejorative catchall for any and all criticisms of 
environmental regulation”). 
 104. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 380. 
 105. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 75 (2008) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Framing Rules].  
 106. Id. at 76; see also Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation, supra note 65, at 104 (“Command 
and control rules impose detailed, legally enforceable limits, conditions, and affirmative 
requirements on industrial operations, generally controlling sources that generate pollution on 
an individual basis.”); ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 270 (noting that most federal environmental 
“statutory authorities dictated ‘command-and-control’ solutions: they directed EPA to regulate 
environmental problems, by setting national standards, issuing permits, inspecting and enforcing 
compliance, ordering corrective action, and fining violators”).  
 107. Karkkainen, Framing Rules, supra note 105, at 75; David J. Sousa & Christopher 
McGrory Klyza, New Directions in Environmental Policy Making: An Emerging Collaborative 
Regime or Reinventing Interest Group Liberalism?, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 377, 378 (2007).  
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system has precipitated ubiquitous, and often intense, criticism over 
the past several decades.108  Most negative critiques levied at the 
regulatory system created by the 1970s environmental statutes claim 
that the conventional approach is inefficient and ineffective.109  
Traditional approaches to environmental regulation are stridently 
criticized on economic efficiency grounds.110  The costs for the 
regulated community to comply with mandatory regulations are 
staggering.  For example, annual expenditures in excess of $200 
billion are necessary to comply with point source pollution control 
regulations in the United States.111 
Critics have long charged that conventional regulation engenders 
considerable inefficiency and waste, and that similar or even greater 
environmental protection results could be achieved by more flexible, 
alternative regulatory approaches at significantly less cost.112  
Historically insufficient budget allocations for enforcement efforts at 
both the federal and state levels only exacerbate the conventional 
system’s problems.113  Moreover, mandatory regulations are 
exceedingly difficult and expensive for governments to implement, 
discouraging the enactment of new statutory programs and the 
 
 108. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 26–32 (surveying various 
criticisms of “command and control” approaches to environmental protection regulation); 
Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation, supra note 65, at 113–18.  
 109. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 378.  
 110. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 28 (noting that some critics argue 
command-and-control mechanisms are economically inefficient, as goals are established without 
fully weighing the costs created against the benefits conferred).  
 111. Paddock, supra note 13, at 10610 (citing DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 1 (2006)). 
 112. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 28–29 (explaining the economic 
inefficiency criticisms of command and control and the reasons why “market-based” incentives 
would be more economically efficient); Ruhl, supra note 98, at 21 n.1 (describing OIRA’s 
calculation of the social benefits  of federal rules imposed from 1994–2004 as being greater than 
the compliance costs, but conceding that these may still not have been the most efficient 
outcomes); ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 270 (noting that because of the additional burdens of 
“command-and-control” regulation on polluters with alternative options to reduce pollution and 
because of the inefficiency of regulating some sources, other approaches, such as “market-based 
incentives” and emissions caps could be better alternatives).  
 113. See David W. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior Through Environmental 
Management Systems, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 81–82 (2006) [hereinafter 
Case, Changing Corporate Behavior] (explaining that because environmental enforcement 
authorities are historically underfunded, existing environmental laws are under-enforced, and 
that therefore the potential benefits of existing laws do not always obtain); see also Mintz, supra 
note 63, at 7–10 (surveying the entire history of EPA fiscal and budgetary constraints due to 
inadequate funding from Congress); Sarah L. Stafford, Private Policing of Environmental 
Performance: Does it Further Public Goals?, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 74 (2012) 
(discussing declining EPA enforcement budgets and staffing).  
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expansion of existing regulatory regimes.114 
Critics further argue that command-and-control regulation is 
inflexible because it inefficiently imposes uniform standards that 
ignore critical distinctions among pollution sources and creates 
disincentives to technological innovation in addressing pollution 
control problems.115  Perhaps the most damning criticism has been 
that many serious environmental problems “fall largely outside of the 
current regulatory system or are not particularly amenable to 
traditional regulatory control.”116  This includes “old environmental 
problems” such as non-point source water pollution and more 
recently recognized problems such as greenhouse-gas emissions and 
other “highly dispersed and less visible sources of pollution.”117 
Nearly from the moment that Congress enacted the first statutes 
in the 1970s, such criticisms of traditional environmental regulation 
have spawned a host of calls for system reform.118  Particularly since 
the mid-1990s, a multitude of reform-minded commentators have 
argued that command-and-control approaches are outdated and 
obsolete.119  To more effectively address old challenges and to 
seriously tackle new problems, reformers argue that the “first 
generation” of environmental regulatory approaches should give way 
 
 114. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 28–30 (explaining that command 
and control “regulation requires regulators to make business and operating decisions” for the 
regulated firms, to promulgate a “staggering” number of “statutes, regulations, and rules,” and 
to acquire expertise in “science, engineering, and economics” in order to properly apply these 
environmental laws). 
 115. Id. at 29–30; Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation, supra note 65, at 118; Karkkainen, 
Framing Rules, supra note 105, at 76;  see also Timothy F. Malloy, The Social Construction of 
Regulation: Lessons From the War Against Command and Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 269 
(2010) (critiquing the “homogeneity proposition [that] posits that command and control 
regulation applies a one-size-fits-all approach that fails to distinguish among firms in terms of 
their economic, technological, or organizational capacities to reduce emissions”).  
 116. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 76; see also Karkkainen, 
Framing Rules, supra note 105, at 79 (noting that a central problem in environmental regulation 
“is to be found in the long list of serious environmental problems that continue to go 
unaddressed by our current regulatory regime”); Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., The Breaking 
the Logjam Project, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2008) (noting that “almost 40 years after the 
passage of our basic federal governing structure, we have learned more about some old 
environmental problems and the limits of the regulatory tools we have used to address them”). 
 117. Casazza Herman et al., supra note 116 at 3–5; KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 28.  
 118. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 32; Karkkainen, Framing Rules, 
supra note 105, at 77 (“Almost from the outset of the era of prescriptive environmental 
regulation, the policy arena has been awash in proposals for regulatory reform, reinvention, and 
reorientation.”).  
 119. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation, 29 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 21, 27–38 (2001) [hereinafter Stewart, New Generation] (arguing that the existing 
federal environmental regulatory system is unable to sustain additional progress). 
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to “next” or “second generation” alternatives.120  Thus, substantial 
effort has been undertaken over the past two decades to study and 
evaluate alternative policy tools that might be used to supplement or, 
in appropriate situations, replace conventional regulatory 
approaches.121  The fundamental goal of such efforts is to create a 
more flexible and effective framework that will increase levels of 
environmental protection while simultaneously lowering costs to both 
regulators and the regulated community.”122 
During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, Presidents Nixon, 
Ford, Carter, and Reagan pursued various environmental regulatory 
reform initiatives, but these efforts were largely administrative, rather 
than substantive, in nature.123  That is, these initiatives sought to 
impose procedures to increase executive control over EPA proposals 
for environmental regulations, rather than to achieve substantive 
reform of the governing statutes themselves.124  Advocacy for 
substantive reform of the command-and-control statutes emerged 
during the 1980s and grew more strident into the early 1990s.125  
Shortly following President Clinton’s election in 1992, these reform 
calls began to gain significant traction.126  In 1993, President Clinton 
announced that Vice President Gore would oversee the National 
Performance Review, a comprehensive evaluation of all federal 
government programs that eventually included EPA and a call for 
“reinvention” of the “command-and-control bureaucracy” of 
 
 120. See, e.g., Debra S. Knopman, Easier to be Green: The Second Generation of 
Environmental Action, in BUILDING THE BRIDGE: 10 BIG IDEAS TO TRANSFORM AMERICA 
163, 164 (Will Marshall ed., 1997) (discussing the need for a “second generation” environmental 
strategy).  See generally THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) [hereinafter 
Chertow & Esty] (discussing ideas to shift federal environmental regulatory policy to “next 
generation” models); Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New 
Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803 (1997) 
(discussing a “utopian” perspective for radical environmental regulatory reform).    
 121. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 40–46, 59–87 (surveying various 
efforts to study and evaluate alternative policy tools); KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 179–
225 (same). 
 122. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 381;  see also Sousa & 
Klyza, supra note 107, at 378–79 (“The ‘next generation’ of environmental policy making seeks 
to give greater priority to economic efficiency, pragmatically balance interests, and allow for 
greater collaboration between government and regulated interests.”).  
 123. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 251; see also Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 
8, at 32; Short, supra note 103, at 639–40. 
 124. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 32; ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 251; 
KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 51.  
 125. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 33.  
 126. Id. at 33–34; Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation, supra note 65, at 109. 
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traditional environmental regulation.127 
In 1995, the Clinton administration released its Reinventing 
Environmental Regulation report, which included numerous 
proposals to reform the federal environmental regulatory system and 
respond to negative critiques of conventional approaches.128  These 
initiatives promoted experimentation with flexible, collaborative 
approaches to environmental policymaking that might eventually lead 
to a fundamental transformation of the command-and-control 
regulatory system.129  Many perceived these initiatives as a defensive 
response by a Democratic White House to the recent and then on-
going Republican-led attacks, in the 104th Congress, on the federal 
environmental regulatory system.130  Commentators have observed 
that the Clinton administration’s reinvention initiatives were 
“alternatives to more radical [environmental regulatory reform] 
efforts suggested by congressional Republicans.”131  At least in part, 
therefore, the Clinton White House embraced “next generation” 
environmental regulatory reform as a political tool and as a means of 
fending off relentless attacks on the federal environmental framework 
from an aggressive Congress.132 
Significantly, the hostile partisanship of the mid-1990s 
congressional battles over the fate of the “first generation” 
environmental regulatory system inspired a plethora of prominent, 
contemporaneous policy reports advocating a move to “next 
generation” regulatory alternatives.133  The National Academy of 
Public Administration,134 the President’s Council on Sustainable 
 
 127. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 34; Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation, 
supra note 65, at 109; Short, supra note 103, at 640.  
 128. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 34; Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 
401–02; see Bill Clinton & Al Gore, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR 
REINVENTING GOV’T at 8–16, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/rsreport/251a.html (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2014) (listing 25 potential alternatives to command-and-control environmental 
regulation).  
 129. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 39–40; Sousa & Klyza, supra note 
107, at 401–02.  
 130. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 34 n.205.  
 131. Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any 
New Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10527, 10527 (1996).  
 132. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 180.  
 133. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 34–35. 
 134. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS: A NEW 
DIRECTION FOR EPA (1995); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, RESOLVING 
THE PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: AN AGENDA FOR CONGRESS, EPA, & THE 
STATES: A REPORT FOR CONGRESS (1997) [hereinafter NAPA, RESOLVING THE PARADOX].  
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Development,135 the Aspen Institute,136 the National Environmental 
Policy Institute,137 Yale University’s Next Generation Project,138 and 
the Enterprise for the Environment issued particularly notable 
reports.139  Numerous environmental law and policy scholars also 
joined in advocating for regulatory reform.140  In 1996, Richard 
Stewart declared that the command-and-control regulatory system 
was a “failing paradigm.”141  In their influential study of federal 
environmental regulation the following year, J. Clarence Davies and 
Jan Mazurek similarly noted that, “[f]or all its accomplishments, . . . 
the pollution control regulatory system is deeply and fundamentally 
flawed.”142  By the end of the decade, the Congressional Research 
Service prepared a report for Congress summarizing existing 
proposals of the many extant “blue-ribbon panels” promoting 
alternatives to  ‘‘command-and-control’’ environmental regulatory 
approaches.143 
In this regard, “next generation” reform advocates during the 
mid-to-late-1990s actively solicited Congressional support for, and 
active participation in, such reform efforts.144  For example, the 
Enterprise for the Environment project, chaired by former Nixon and 
 
 135. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW 
CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE 
FUTURE (1996). 
 136. ASPEN INST., SERIES ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, THE 
ALTERNATIVE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER WAY TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE 
ENVIRONMENT (1996). 
 137. NAT’L ENVTL. POLICY INST., REINVENTING THE VEHICLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT (1995); NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE, INTEGRATING 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A BLUEPRINT FOR 21ST CENTURY ENVIRONMENTALISM (1996). 
 138. See Chertow & Esty, supra note 120, at i (noting the influence of “The Next Generation 
Project sponsored by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy”).  
 139. ENTER. FOR THE ENV’T,, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN 
TRANSITION: TOWARD A MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE (1997). 
 140. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing 
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 585–91 (1996) (criticizing the “[u]niform ‘one size fits all’” 
environmental policies currently in place as “destined to fail unless basic changes are made.”); J. 
CLARENCE DAVIES & JANICE MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE U.S. SYSTEM 
WORK? 2 (1997) (“For all its accomplishments, we conclude that the pollution control 
regulatory system is deeply and fundamentally flawed.”). 
 141. Stewart, supra note 140, at 585–91.  
 142. DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 140, at 2.  
 143. JOHN E. BLODGETT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 
RL30760: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: NEW APPROACHES (2000).  
 144. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 59 (mentioning calls for 
Congress to more actively participate in reinvention experimentation).  
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Reagan EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus,145 urged that, 
“[w]ithout giving up its essential oversight responsibilities, Congress 
should begin to see itself as a partner in helping to improve the 
[environmental regulatory] system and creating incentives for 
innovation and change.”146  Similarly, the National Academy of Public 
Administration’s report called upon Congress to signal its support for 
the learning curve of experimentation with alternative regulatory 
approaches at EPA by “authorizing reinvention experiments . . . and 
appropriating funds to the efforts.”147  Despite such entreaties, 
however, Congress did not perceive itself as a partner in the 1990s 
environmental regulatory reform efforts, and, with one very minor 
exception, failed to enact any legislation to support the Clinton era 
reinvention initiatives.148 
In the wake of George W. Bush’s victory in the 2000 presidential 
election, national efforts to pursue “next generation” alternatives to 
traditional environmental regulation receded significantly.149  
Environmental issues in general were a low priority during both terms 
of the George W. Bush administration.150  From the standpoint of 
regulatory innovation, EPA under the Bush administration focused 
primarily on promoting voluntary environmental regulatory 
initiatives that encouraged firms to improve corporate environmental 
performance beyond levels required by mandatory regulatory 
requirements.151  However, while the reform-minded push for more 
efficient and effective environmental regulatory approaches did not 
 
 145. ENTER. FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 139, at ix; Andrews, supra note 2, at 230, 237.  
 146. ENTER. FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 139, at viii; see also id. at 48 (further describing the 
“critical role” of Congress “in an improved environmental protection system,” and emphasizing 
that “Congress should see itself as a partner with the executive branch in the [environmental 
protection system] reassessment process, and it should provide agencies with the resources they 
need to carry out their congressionally mandated missions”).  
 147. NAPA, RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 134, at 37. 
 148. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 53; see also id. at 328 n.28 (noting the minor 
exception was legislation enabling EPA’s National Environmental Performance Partnership 
System with the states).   
 149. See id. at 286, 307–08 (noting partisanship of Bush years impeded efforts to “find 
middle ground”).  
 150. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 401; see also Andrews, supra note 2, at 247–51 
(describing how the Bush administration’s EPA record was a low point in agency history).  
 151. See Darnall & Sides, supra note 13, at 96–97 (explaining what Voluntary 
Environmental Programs are); KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 309 (discussing Performance 
Track program as “the most prominent” volunteer program of the Bush administration); see 
also Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons from the Rise 
and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) 
[hereinafter Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem] (noting that EPA had 
created more than sixty different voluntary environmental programs by the mid-2000s). 
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disappear altogether, such efforts received extremely minimal priority 
during the Bush administration’s later years.152  Most certainly, the 
desires of “next generation” reform advocates for implementation of 
meaningful alternative environmental regulatory approaches were 
substantially marginalized during the George W. Bush years.153 
In 2007, as the end of the Bush era drew near, hope blossomed 
that the next presidential administration and the next Congress might 
prove more receptive to implementation of “next generation” 
environmental regulatory strategies.  The New York University 
School of Law and New York Law School jointly hosted a seminar in 
the fall of 2007, and a subsequent two-day conference in March 2008, 
at which “over forty environmental law experts from around the 
country and across the ideological spectrum [were enlisted] to 
propose statutory and institutional changes” for the national 
environmental protection system.154  This ambitious project—titled 
Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress 
and Administration—was founded on the proposition that “political 
polarization and a lack of leadership have left environmental 
protection in the United States burdened with obsolescent statutes 
and regulatory strategies.”155  Thus, the symposium organizers 
declared that “an urgent need” existed “for innovative strategies for 
environmental protection that will break the political logjam and 
meet environmental challenges that have become increasingly 
complex.”156 
Over thirty essays and articles from participants in the Breaking 
the Logjam project were subsequently published in a two-volume 
symposium issue of the New York University Environmental Law 
Journal.157  Further, a report collating the proposals coming out of the 
project was prepared and published to coincide with the installation 
of the 111th Congress and the Barack Obama administration in 
January 2009.158  The report emphasized that its purpose was “to 
 
 152. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 307–08 (noting that environmental regulatory 
reform initiatives “swirl[ed] in the back eddies of environmental policymaking in the last years 
of the Bush administration”).  
 153. See id. at 286 (listing “next generation” advocates as the group whose standing has 
dropped the most since the late 1990s).  
 154. Casazza Herman et al., supra note 116, at 2.  
 155. Id. at 1.  
 156. Id. at 2.  
 157. 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–1046 (2008).  
 158. DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM 
FOR THE NEW CONGRESS AND ADMINISTRATION (2009).  
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provide a constructive starting point for the political dialogue that is 
necessary to achieve environmental law reform.”159  Among other 
things, the report encouraged policymakers to consider a number of 
alternative regulatory strategies to supplement, rather than replace, 
traditional hierarchical regulatory approaches “to help make 
environmental protection regulation smarter, more flexible, and more 
cost effective.”160 
Notwithstanding the optimism underlying the Breaking the 
Logjam appeal to overcome partisan gridlock on environmental 
issues in Congress, the ambitious effort had no apparent effect on 
policymakers.  Legislative gridlock and partisan polarization on 
environmental and most other issues not only intensified following 
the election of President Obama in 2008, but has since reached 
historically high levels.161  A glimmer of movement appeared in 2009 
when the House passed the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act,162 a comprehensive climate change bill that featured a cap-and-
trade marketable permit program.163  Subsequent to this momentous 
occurrence, however, the Senate never even came close to passing 
this or any other climate change legislation, and the opportunity to 
enact “the most significant environmental law of a generation” 
quickly disappeared.164  Congress also failed to meaningfully respond 
to the environmental catastrophe of the worst oil spill in United 
States history—the 2010 blowout of BP’s Deepwater Horizon in the 
Gulf of Mexico.165  On these and many other recent high profile 
environmental challenges, environmental gridlock has prevailed and 
Congress continues to do nothing.166 
From its outset, the Obama administration demonstrated a 
decidedly negative view toward “next generation” environmental 
regulatory reform concepts.  Within days of the January 2008 
 
  159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 4, 6.  
 161. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 285–90 (discussing environmental policymaking 
between 2008 and 2012).  
 162. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).  
 163. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 291.  
 164. Id. at 291–92.  
 165. See Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2324, 2355–58 (noting that “no new substantive legislation 
has been adopted” since the BP spill); see also KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 301 
(describing “venomous partisanship” that blocked any action in Congress to reduce the 
possibility of future spills in deepwater drilling).  
 166. See Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2326, 2350–66 (describing the lack of congressional 
attention to such issues as climate change, deepwater oil exploration and development, 
hydraulic fracturing or fracking, and the production of coal and disposal of coal ash).  
19_Case_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/14/2015  6:29 PM 
72 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXV:49 
announcement by then President-elect Obama that Lisa Jackson 
would serve as EPA administrator, Ms. Jackson dismissed the Bush 
administration EPA’s “flagship” voluntary environmental program, 
the National Environmental Performance Track, as “one of those 
window-dressing programs that has little value.”167  Shortly after 
taking office, Administrator Jackson quickly cancelled the 
Performance Track program as well as Climate Leaders, another high 
profile Bush era EPA voluntary program.168  Scholars have viewed 
these actions as the Obama administration’s rejection of the very 
premises of these next generation programs and in alignment with its 
commitment to a more aggressive approach to enforcement under 
conventional environmental programs than that taken by the previous 
administration.169 
IV. “NEXT GENERATION” ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY 
REFORM PROPOSALS 
The well-established shortcomings of traditional environmental 
regulation, together with the excessively partisan and increasingly 
gridlocked policymaking climate, have encouraged promotion of a 
wide variety of alternative regulatory approaches since the early 
1970s.  Breaking the multitude of proposed mechanisms into discrete 
categories is difficult, but a basic taxonomy of proposed reforms has 
emerged in the environmental literature over the years.170  The most 
widely discussed and analyzed of the “next generation” reform 
options include market-based regulatory instruments, voluntary or 
“self-regulatory” policies, and various forms of contractual or 
collaborative decision-making.171 
A. Market-Based Regulatory Instruments 
Regulatory reform advocates have long advocated using 
environmental markets—such as cap and trade, “bubble” programs, 
 
 167. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 4, 8; KLYZA 
& SOUSA, supra note 13, at 310.  
 168. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 8, 34; KLYZA 
& SOUSA, supra note 13, at 310.  
 169. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 310.  
 170. See, e.g., Short, supra note 103, at 664 (breaking reform proposals into broad 
categories); Karkkainen, Framing Rules, supra note 105, at 77–78 (listing various categories of 
regulatory reform mechanisms).  
 171. See Short, supra note 103, at 665–66 (discussing different types of market-based 
regulation); Karkkainen, Framing Rules, supra note 105, at 77–78 (mentioning various types of 
proposed regulatory reinvention mechanisms).  
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and other incentive-based regulatory instruments—to supplement or 
even substitute for command-and-control approaches.172  Economists 
and legal scholars advocated use of market-based regulatory 
instruments as a means of pollution control even before the 
environmental decade of the 1970s.173  “Green taxes” and other price-
based schemes are examples of market-based regulations that seek to 
affect the behavior of environmental actors by creating economic 
incentives for firms to internalize the external costs of polluting 
activities.174 
The perceived benefit of such a regulatory approach over 
command-and-control regulation is that firms are permitted the 
flexibility to find the most cost-effective solutions in addressing the 
external harm that the market incentives seek to regulate.175  Congress 
has rejected such approaches in the past as (1) unreliable, given the 
difficulty of establishing an efficient and effective price incentive, and 
(2) unrealistic, given the political unpopularity of regulatory taxes.176  
Even though “green taxes” are a widely utilized regulatory tool in 
Europe, the pervasive aversion to taxation in American politics 
virtually guarantees that Congress will avoid any such regulatory 
approach to environmental protection in the United States for the 
foreseeable future.177  Political realities aside, environmental scholars 
nonetheless argue that “efficiency-oriented instruments [such] as 
tradable permits, corrective taxes, disclosure schemes, and other tools 
designed to replicate the conditions of a well-functioning market” 
should be the future of American environmental regulation.178 
Emissions-trading schemes, in which firms can freely trade 
pollution credits within a market created and monitored by 
government regulators,179 have proven to be a somewhat more 
politically palatable market-based regulatory approach.  Under the 
basic concept of a cap-and-trade system, the government establishes 
 
 172. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest 
Proposals for the Future of Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245, 245 (2001) (offering the 
expansion of environmental markets, including cap and trade, as recommendations for the “next 
generation” of environmental regulation). 
 173. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 270.  
 174. Short, supra note 103, at 665–66. 
 175. Id. at 666.  
 176. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 270.  
 177. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in 
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1419 (2008) [hereinafter Karkkainen, 
Bottlenecks].  
 178. Kysar, supra note 96, at 675.  
 179. Short, supra note 103, at 665. 
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an overall emissions cap and then issues an equivalent quantity of 
marketable permits among the regulated polluters.180  More efficient 
companies that emit less than they have been allocated are allowed to 
sell their excess permits to companies unable to make reductions as 
easily or as cheaply.181  This creates a system that can achieve a set 
level of overall reductions, while rewarding the most efficient 
companies and seeking to meet the cap at the lowest possible cost to 
the economy.182 
As noted previously, the 2009 comprehensive climate change bill 
that passed in the House, but ultimately failed in the Senate, featured 
a market-based cap and trade program to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions.183  Two decades earlier, in the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990, Congress actually enacted a cap and trade program to 
regulate the interstate acid rain problem that proliferated during the 
1970s, created by sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from 
major American power plants.184  This tradable permit system is 
widely acknowledged to have been extraordinarily successful and has 
thus become an exemplar of the potential of reform-minded 
alternative regulatory strategies.185  The economic incentives created 
by the program achieved far greater emissions reductions more 
rapidly and cheaply than had been the case with technology-based 
regulations.186 
Observers caution that the acid rain problem, with its relatively 
well-identified and relatively finite market, was particularly suited for 
this type of market-based approach.187  Other more complex and far-
reaching pollution challenges might not respond as well to a tradable 
permit regime as to traditional regulatory approaches.188  In this 
regard, many commentators stress that market-based incentive 
approaches are not the optimal approach to solving every conceivable 
 
 180. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 270.  
 181. Id.; Short, supra note 103, at 665.  
 182. See Bruce Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 1333, 1341–48 (1985) (noting the goal of programs is “achievement of the 
environmental quality level that would result if all sources installed BAT controls on their 
discharges” and discussing incentives designed to promote this goal while rewarding those who 
achieve it at the lowest cost).  
 183. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text.  
 184. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 271; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 628–29. 
 185. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 271.   
 186. Id.   
 187. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 630.  
 188. Id.; ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 271.  
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pollution control problem.189  Instead, policymakers should consider 
the appropriate domain for a market-based regulatory approach and 
utilize such tools only where they best supplement and work 
alongside traditional command-and-control approaches.190 
B. Voluntary or “Self-Regulatory” Policies 
“Self-regulatory” environmental policy instruments have long 
been a staple of the “next generation” reform toolkit.191  Since the late 
1980s, regulatory reform advocates have promoted the concept of 
industry “self-regulation,” which favors industry-proposed alternative 
compliance plans as a substitute for specific command-and-control 
regulatory requirements.192  Industry, government regulators, and 
concerned citizen groups typically collaborate on the design of such 
self-regulatory alternative plans.193  In contrast to the “government 
micro-management” that is the foundation of traditional regulatory 
approaches, self-regulation affords industry the freedom and 
flexibility to select the means and methods of complying with 
environmental performance standards and objectives.194  Self-
regulatory approaches generally include some level of government 
review and public involvement, although the degree varies with the 
specific self-regulatory policy tool utilized.195  Industry self-regulation 
is sometimes presented as an alternative to traditional government 
regulation, but is also often encouraged as a means of supplementing, 
rather than replacing, traditional regulatory approaches.196  Critiques 
of the self-regulation concept run the gamut from enthusiastic to 
deeply skeptical.197 
 
 189. See Karkkainen, Bottlenecks, supra note 177, at 1417–18 (noting that cap-and-trade 
programs are not ideal when there are concerns about localized concentrations of pollutants and 
discussing the public health concerns that were not addressed with the acid rain cap and trade 
system); Elliott, supra note 172, at 246–48. 
 190. Elliott, supra note 172, at 246–47.  
 191. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 36; see Toddi A. Steelman & Jorge 
Rivera, Voluntary Environmental Programs in the United States, 19 ORG. & ENV’T 505, 507 
(2006) (detailing the various approaches to self-regulation—voluntary initiatives, negotiated 
agreements, and unilateral programs—that have expanded since the 1980s.   
 192. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 36.  
 193. Id. 
 194. Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation, supra note 65, at 104. 
 195. Id.  
 196. See, e.g., Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 109 (urging that 
despite its promise as an aid to environmental regulatory goals, self-regulation “is unlikely to 
ever be a feasible substitute for direct legal controls on corporate environmental behavior.”)  
 197. See Andrew King & Michael W. Toffel, Self-regulatory Institutions for Solving 
Environmental Problems: Perspectives and Contributions from the Management Literature, in 
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1. Informational Regulation 
Self-regulatory mechanisms are sometimes characterized as 
another form of market-based regulation, given that many such 
mechanisms rely on market forces to create incentives for self-
regulatory behavior by environmental actors.198  One such example 
includes the concept of “informational regulation,” which emerged in 
the late 1980s as a potential success story in the search for effective 
and efficient next generation alternatives to traditional environmental 
regulation.199  Advocates of informational regulation argue that public 
distribution of information can lead to self-regulatory improvement in 
the environmental performance of business and industry.200  Public 
information disclosure encourages such beneficial environmental 
behavioral change through social and market-based pressures created 
by informal monitoring regimes triggered by such disclosure.201  These 
informal regimes include external monitoring performed by 
government regulators, local communities, industry competitors, 
economic markets, and self-monitoring by firm managers.202 
The perception that informational regulatory strategies can 
 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 98, 112–13 (Magali Delmas & 
Oran Young eds., 2009) (exploring management literature that suggest self-regulation should be 
taken seriously as a solution to environmental problems); Al Iannuzzi, Self-Regulation – Has Its 
Time Come?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10917, 10921–22 (2003) (noting that self-regulation has resulted 
in companies voluntarily reducing emission of pollutants but that there are risks associated with 
self-regulation such as corruption); Karkkainen, Bottlenecks, supra note 177177, at 1415 (“The 
problem with self-regulation . . .  is accountability; industry’s incentive will always be to seek the 
least-cost solution . . .  even if it means externalizing costs (like excessive levels of pollution) to 
society.  Predictably, then, self-regulation will tend toward regulating with an exceedingly light 
hand, and this tendency will be compounded by a lack of transparency and accountability in the 
decision-making process.”). 
 198. See Short, supra note 103, at 666–68 (noting that “self-regulation is sometimes 
characterized as a particular type of market-based regulation” while discussing both similarities 
and differences with what are typically viewed as market-based approaches); see also Lesley K. 
McAllister, Regulation by Third Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 25 (2012) (“Examples of 
market-based environmental regulation include . . . information regulation, such as corporate 
environmental reporting requirements.”). 
 199. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 100, 93.  
 200. Sarah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on 
Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 519–23 (2013); David W. Case, The Law and Economics of 
Environmental Information as Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10773, 10785 (2001) [hereinafter 
Case, Environmental Information as Regulation]; Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, 
supra note 103, at 381 & n.11.  
 201. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and 
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 261–62 (2001) 
[hereinafter Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation]; Case, Environmental 
Information as Regulation, supra note 200, at 10785–86.  
 202. Case, Environmental Information as Regulation, supra note 200, at 10785–86.  
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successfully create conditions leading to desirable self-regulatory 
environmental behavior is largely fueled by the relative success of the 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).  The TRI was created in 1986 by the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know-Act 
(EPCRA).203  Manufacturing facilities have been required to report to 
the TRI program since 1988.204  Public access to TRI information has 
been credited with influencing companies to make voluntary 
reductions in releases of the chemicals subject to the reporting 
requirements.205  EPA asserts that public dissemination of information 
from the TRI database has induced companies to sharply reduce 
overall levels of releases of TRI chemicals since the program’s 
beginning.206  These reductions have occurred despite the fact that the 
releases may be completely lawful under existing environmental 
regulatory programs.207  Importantly, EPCRA’s TRI reporting 
requirement does not itself make the releases of toxic chemicals to 
air, water or land unlawful.208  The requirement is simply that the 
releases must be reported annually and that the information must 
subsequently be made publicly available.209 
In addition to experience with the TRI, some limited studies by 
economists have shown that public disclosure of negative 
environmental information by companies can motivate them to 
improve their future environmental performance.210  These studies 
 
 203. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, 
Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Law on Toxic Emissions, 32 
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 110 (1997) (explaining that the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act required certain manufacturers to disclose details of toxic 
chemical emissions).  
 204. Id. 
 205. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 385–86; ANDREWS, supra 
note 9, at 273; Bernard A. Weintraub, Access to Information, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 265, 276 
(Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008).  
 206. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 385 & n.31; see also Light, 
supra note 200, at 521 (“TRI reporting rules have led to drastic reductions in the use and release 
of toxic chemicals.”). 
 207. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 385–86.  
 208. See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 273 (noting that the EPCRA just required industries to 
report their use and release of hundreds of toxic chemicals as opposed to regulating those 
emissions). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Konar & Cohen, supra note 203, at 123 (concluding that when new information is 
released about a company’s emissions and has an effect on that company’s valuation, the 
company is likely to reduce emissions and improve environmental performance); James T. 
Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory 
Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON & MGMT. 98, 112 (1995) (finding that TRI data is of value to 
19_Case_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/14/2015  6:29 PM 
78 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXV:49 
suggest that, in theory, post-disclosure pressures brought to bear by 
economic markets and public opinion create market incentives that 
positively affect the behavior of environmental actors.211  However, 
the effect that information disclosure has on these market forces is 
poorly understood, at best.212  Even so, such empirical evidence 
encourages advocates of “informational regulation” to seek increased 
use of this alternative regulatory strategy as a tool for protecting the 
environment.213 
2. Environmental Self-Management 
Another alternative self-regulatory approach that has been 
widely scrutinized in academic literature concerns policies that 
promote or require “environmental self-management,” such as 
through implementation of corporate environmental management 
systems (EMSs).214  An EMS “is a formal set of internal procedures 
and policies that create a framework for an organization to identify, 
minimize, and manage environmental impacts, ensure compliance 
 
journalists and investors, and that stock prices would decrease when companies disclosed 
information about emissions); Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool 
for Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON & MGMT. 243, 265 (1998) (noting that 
repeated provision of information about company’s emissions affected the value of the company 
over time, and that this led to companies increasing off-site transfers to recycling and treatment 
facilities).  For further discussion of these studies, see Case, Environmental Information as 
Regulation, supra note 200, at 10777–79. 
 211. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 383. 
 212. See id. at 386 (“The effect of TRI disclosure on firm environmental behavior has 
generated considerable academic interest in environmental informational regulation.  Scholarly 
literature in this area sounds both optimistic and cautionary tones regarding the potential 
benefits of this approach as an environmental protection policy tool.”). 
 213. See Light, supra note 200, at 519 (concluding that informational regulation would be 
effective when used in conjunction with traditional regulatory mechanisms, such as taxes); Case, 
Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 105–06 (explaining disclosure of information 
about environmental practices will increase communication between managers and stakeholders 
and will induce the company to internalize important societal values and possibly change its 
behavior); Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 438–42 (concluding that 
“to effectuate positive corporate environmental behavioral change, public information 
disclosure mechanisms must be incorporated within formal EMS standards”). 
 214. E.g., Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 77; Cary Coglianese, The 
Managerial Turn in Environmental Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 55 (2008) [hereinafter 
Coglianese, Managerial Turn]; LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED 
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 14–17 (Cary Coglianese & 
Jennifer Nash eds., 2006); Richard N.L. Andrews et al., Environmental Management Systems: 
History, Theory, and Implementation Research, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 31, 31–33 (Cary 
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001); Hope Babcock, Corporate Environmental Social 
Responsibility: Corporate “Greenwashing” or a Corporate Culture Game Changer?, 21 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 55–58 (2010).  
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with applicable environmental laws and regulations, and reduce 
wasteful use of natural resources.”215  Cary Coglianese and Jennifer 
Nash characterize policies to promote the use of these and other self-
management tools as “management-based” regulatory strategy “used 
by those outside an organization to change the management practices 
and behaviors of those on the inside.”216 
The potential benefits of this form of self-regulatory approach 
are increased compliance with existing command-and-control 
regulatory requirements and “beyond compliance” reduction of 
currently unregulated environmental impacts and risks.217  Indeed, 
some empirical evidence suggests that EMS-based regulatory 
approaches may more effectively improve unregulated environmental 
impacts than those already the subject of traditional regulation.218  
Again, however, commentators routinely caution that such self-
regulatory policies should function only as supplements, rather than 
replacements, to existing environmental regulatory approaches.219 
3. Voluntary Environmental Programs 
Perhaps the self-regulatory mechanism that has been most 
actively explored over the past two decades, particularly by EPA, is 
voluntary environmental regulatory initiatives, also known in 
environmental literature as “voluntary environmental programs.”220  
Broadly speaking, these programs seek to encourage firms to 
voluntarily improve corporate environmental performance beyond 
levels required by mandatory environmental regulatory regimes.221  
 
 215. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 77.  
 216. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management-Based Strategies for Improving Private-
Sector Environmental Performance, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10005 (2006) [hereinafter 
Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies].  
 217. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 109.  
 218. See Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 216, at 10012 
(detailing a study that found management systems can improve unregulated aspects of business, 
such as spills and energy conservation that are controlled by internal management and 
coordination).  
 219. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 109; Babcock, supra note 214, at 
2.  
 220. See Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 3 (“Of the 
various innovations initiated by EPA over the last twenty years, the development of voluntary 
environmental programs has been among the most distinctive.”).  See generally Cary Coglianese 
& Jennifer Nash, Government Clubs: Theory and Evidence from Voluntary Environmental 
Programs, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE 231 (Matthew Potoski 
& Aseem Prakash eds., 2009) [hereinafter Coglianese & Nash, Government Clubs] (analyzing 
the ways that voluntary programs run by EPA “[attract] members while upholding standards”).  
 221. Darnall & Sides, supra note 13, at 96; Bruce Paton, Voluntary Environmental Initiatives 
19_Case_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/14/2015  6:29 PM 
80 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXV:49 
Voluntary initiatives can be either private or public efforts.  They can 
come in many forms, including “programs, codes, agreements, and 
commitments” that require industries, firms, or facilities to improve 
their environmental performance.222  Although there is considerable 
variation within categories, such initiatives tend to fall within four 
types of approaches: public voluntary programs established and 
promoted by governmental authorities (also referred to as “voluntary 
challenge” programs); negotiated voluntary agreements between 
firms and regulators (discussed in subsection IV.C. below); private 
voluntary programs initiated and promoted by industry associations 
or non-governmental organizations;223 and unilateral initiatives 
established by and undertaken within a single firm.224 
At the height of the environmental regulatory reform debates in 
the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, consensus on how to 
best reform the existing system was elusive.225  Because political and 
social conflict often accompanied such debate, voluntary 
environmental programs became a popular alternative for obtaining 
environmental improvements from business and industry outside the 
 
and Sustainable Industry, 9 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 328, 328 (2000) [hereinafter Paton, 
Voluntary Environmental Initiatives].  
 222. Darnall & Sides, supra note 13, at 96; see also Paton, Voluntary Environmental 
Initiatives, supra note 221, at 329 (identifying the four types of voluntary initiatives that can be 
used to reduce pollution and increase sustainability).  
 223. See Paton, Voluntary Environmental Initiatives, supra note 221, at 329 (describing 
voluntary challenges, negotiated agreements, and private codes that are three of the four types 
of voluntary initiatives).  The most widely known industry promoted private voluntary initiative 
is the “Responsible Care” program developed in 1989 by the American Chemistry Council 
(formerly known as the Chemical Manufacturers Association).  Jennifer Nash & John R. 
Ehrenfeld, Factors That Shape EMS Outcomes in Firms, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: 
CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS 61, 64 (Cary 
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001); see Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, “Voluntary” 
Approaches to Environmental Regulation: A Survey, in ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 75, 78–79 (Maurizio Franzini & Antonio Nicita eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Lyon & Maxwell, “Voluntary” Approaches] (summarizing three examples of 
voluntary negotiated agreements between regulators and businesses to reduce emissions). 
Perhaps the best known non-governmental organization initiated private voluntary program was 
launched in late 1989 by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES).  
The Ceres Principles, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/about-us/our-history/ceres-principles (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2014).   
 224. Paton, Voluntary Environmental Initiatives, supra note 221, at 329; Steelman & Rivera, 
supra note 191, at 507; Kathryn Harrison, Challenges in Evaluating Voluntary Environmental 
Programs, in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION, 
AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES 263, 264–65 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Harrison, Voluntary Environmental Programs].  
 225. Darnall & Sides, supra note 13, at 97; Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 
26–59. 
19_Case_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/14/2015  6:29 PM 
Fall 2014] THE LOST GENERATION 81 
context of reform of specific statutory programs.226  The perceived 
value in using voluntary initiatives in this manner was the ability to 
directly address environmental issues that concerned citizens or 
public interest groups, while simultaneously avoiding the difficult 
political conflicts often associated with regulatory reform efforts.227  In 
industrialized countries, environmental authorities have typically 
utilized voluntary environmental regulatory initiatives to encourage 
“beyond compliance” behavior by regulated entities, or to limit 
pollution such as greenhouse gases for which there were no 
mandatory regulations in place.228  In contrast, developing countries 
have generally utilized voluntary programs to compensate for 
“rampant non-compliance” with and weak enforcement of mandatory 
environmental regulations.229 
Public voluntary programs are initiatives by the government to 
challenge targeted firms or industries to improve their environmental 
performance beyond regulatory requirements.230 Criteria for 
eligibility, rewards for participation, and performance obligations for 
participating firms are established by environmental regulators or 
other public bodies.231  Although governmental bodies promote these 
programs to industry, the specific performance targets and timetables 
are not negotiated with industry or participants in advance.232  A 
public voluntary program is generally an open-ended challenge that 
applies widely to particular industry sectors or types of firms, but 
which no particular firm is expected or required to accept.233  Many 
voluntary challenge programs are accompanied by an explicit or 
 
 226. Darnall & Sides, supra note 13, at 97. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Alan Blackman et al., Voluntary Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries: 
Mexico’s Clean Industry Program 1 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper  No. 07-36, July 
2007), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-07-36.pdf.  
 229. Id.  
 230. John Moffet & Francois Bregha, Non-Regulatory Environmental Measures, in 
VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES: THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING 15, 16 (Robert B. 
Gibson ed., 1999); Harrison, Voluntary Environmental Programs, supra note 224, at 264.  
 231. Richard D. Morgenstern & William A. Pizer, Introduction: The Challenge of Evaluating 
Voluntary Programs, in REALITY CHECK: THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN 1, 4 (Richard D. 
Morgenstern & William A. Pizer eds., 2007) [hereinafter Morgenstern & Pizer, Evaluating 
Voluntary Programs].  
 232. Id.  
 233. Harrison, Voluntary Environmental Programs, supra note 224, at 264; Philippe 
Thalmann & Andrea Baranzini, An Overview of the Economics of Voluntary Approaches in 
Climate Policies, in VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN CLIMATE POLICY 1, 5 (Andrea Baranzini & 
Philippe Thalmann eds., 2004).  
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implied threat of regulation or other mandatory policy instruments—
such as taxes—should voluntary approaches fail.234  Some public 
voluntary programs are less coercive, with no threats of regulation or 
penalties for nonparticipation.235 
In addition to threats of future regulation, public agencies offer 
various incentive combinations to encourage participation in public 
voluntary programs, including “favorable publicity, technical 
assistance, and opportunities for positive interactions with 
regulators.”236  Public recognition is typically provided through 
awards, press announcements, and the ability to use product logos 
indicating participation in a particular program.237  Other less tangible 
incentives offered by public authorities to encourage participation 
may include access to information on new technologies or approaches 
for reducing costs in pollution abatement programs.238 
Firms that participate in public voluntary programs typically 
commit to specific goals in a “memorandum of understanding” with 
the public agency, although the commitment is nonbinding and no 
penalty is imposed for withdrawal from the program or 
nonperformance of the specific goals.239  However, withdrawal or 
nonperformance does result in losing all benefits of participation, 
including the public recognition that the program provides.240  
Information disclosure and dissemination are often required to 
participate in public voluntary programs, which allows government 
authorities to make program adjustments and enhances the public 
pressure aspect of participation.241 
During the 1990s, EPA became strongly committed to the use of 
 
 234. Harrison, Talking with the Donkey, supra note 103, at 56.  
 235. Id.  
 236. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Environmental Public Voluntary Programs 
Reconsidered, 35 POL’Y STUD. J. 723, 723 (2007) [hereinafter Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary 
Programs Reconsidered]. 
 237. Janice Mazurek, Government-Sponsored Voluntary Programs for Firms: An Initial 
Survey, in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION, AND 
VOLUNTARY MEASURES 219, 223 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2002).  
 238. LADA V. KOCHTCHEEVA, COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA: INSTITUTIONS, FLEXIBLE INSTRUMENTS, AND GOVERNANCE 
110–11 (2009).  
 239. Dinah A. Koehler, The Effectiveness of Voluntary Environmental Programs – A Policy 
at a Crossroads?, 35 POL’Y STUD. J. 689, 691 (2007).  
 240. Mazurek, supra note 237, at 223.  
 241. Koehler, supra note 239, at 692; Harrison, Voluntary Environmental Programs, supra 
note 224, at 264–65.  
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public voluntary programs as a regulatory policy tool.242  The best-
known EPA public voluntary program is perhaps the first; the 33/50 
program launched in 1989, and often referred to as “the grandfather 
of all voluntary programs.”243  The program encouraged participants 
to voluntarily reduce emissions of 17 high-priority toxic chemicals 
that were also required to be reported to the TRI under EPCRA.244  
The program sought to reduce emissions 33% by the end of 1992 and 
50% by the end of 1995.245  Individual participating firms were 
encouraged to set their own reduction goals and to choose their own 
methods of achieving them.246  Eventually, firms that accounted for 
more than 60% of the 33/50 chemical releases agreed to participate in 
the program.247 
EPA eventually declared the 33/50 program a success, claiming 
that the initiative achieved its goals by 1994, a full year ahead of 
schedule, primarily through the voluntary efforts of participating 
firms.248  The perceived success of the 33/50 program led EPA to 
initiate additional public voluntary programs.  By the time the 33/50 
program ended in 1996, EPA had established more than eighty 
voluntary programs.249  By the mid-2000s, EPA managed more than 
sixty national-scope public voluntary programs at the federal level.250 
The largest number of EPA initiated public voluntary programs, 
by a substantial margin, has been in the areas of pollution prevention 
and climate change.251  However, EPA initiatives have been 
developed in a wide variety of areas, including agriculture, air and 
water quality, energy efficiency, waste management, and product 
labeling.252  Some EPA initiatives are quite innovative and unique.  
 
 242. Koehler, supra note 239, at 689. 
 243. Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 729; Madhu 
Khanna, The U.S. 33/50 Voluntary Program: Its Design and Effectiveness, in REALITY CHECK: 
THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN 15, 15 (Richard D. Morgenstern & William A. Pizer 
eds., 2007).  
 244. Khanna, supra note 243, at 15.  
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 38; Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 723.  
 247. Khanna, supra note 243, at 39.  
 248. Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 724.  
 249. Khanna, supra note 243, at 38.  
 250. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 3; Koehler, 
supra note 239, at 692.  
 251. Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 723; Mazurek, 
supra note 237, at 221.   
 252. Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 723.  
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For instance, in 1998 EPA established the HPV Challenge Program 
under the auspices of the Clinton-era Chemical Right-to-Know 
initiative.253  This initiative encouraged the chemical industry to 
voluntarily perform scientific testing to generate previously 
unavailable baseline health and environmental effects data for “high 
production volume” chemicals produced in or imported into the 
United States.254 
For nearly a decade, the flagship EPA voluntary program was 
the National Environmental Performance Track.  Performance Track 
was established in 2000 during the Clinton administration and, as 
discussed above, ended by the Obama administration EPA in 2009.255  
The premise of the program was to create meaningful incentives for 
environmental leaders to voluntarily achieve “beyond compliance” 
environmental performance.256  These incentives included being 
designated as low priority for routine inspections and reduced 
regulatory and administrative requirements.257  In exchange for the 
rewards and recognition provided by the program, Performance 
Track members were expected to maintain regulatory compliance and 
develop environmental goals exceeding the existing regulatory 
requirements.258  Together with others of its next generation 
programs, EPA intended for Performance Track to “shift . . . the 
curve” of environmental performance in the regulated community “in 
the direction of environmental excellence.”259 
In a recent extensive analysis of the Performance Track, Cary 
Coglianese and Jennifer Nash found that close scrutiny of the 
program did not support EPA’s “sweeping assertions” regarding the 
program’s beneficial achievements.260  At best, “only the most modest 
overall impact” on environmental quality could be attributed to the 
program.261  This is consistent with the broader perception among 
 
 253. David W. Case, The EPA’s HPV Challenge Program: A Tort Liability Trap?, 62 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 147, 159–62 (2005) [hereinafter Case, HPV Challenge Program].  
 254. Id.  
 255. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 4–8; see supra 
notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 256. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 15; Case, 
Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 75–76.  
 257. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 15; Case, 
Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 75–76. 
 258. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 15.  
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. at 1. 
 261. Id. at 64.  
19_Case_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/14/2015  6:29 PM 
Fall 2014] THE LOST GENERATION 85 
scholars that EPA voluntary programs so far have been disappointing 
in terms of both results and impacts.262  Explanations for the merely 
marginal impacts that voluntary initiatives have had on 
environmental protection problems include the consistently low 
participation rates within these programs.263  Nonetheless, given the 
current gridlock in Congress, interest in such voluntary programs has 
not waned.264  EPA under the Obama administration, despite 
cancelling the Performance Track program, continues to operate 
dozens of other voluntary environmental programs.265  Such programs 
thus remain “increasingly attractive avenues for seeking 
environmental improvement in the absence of new legislative 
authority” from Congress.266 
C. Contractual or Collaborative Decision Making 
A separate strand of the next generation environmental reform 
movement has involved advocacy for “collaborative” or 
“cooperative” approaches to environmental regulation.267  Given the 
adversarial nature and litigiousness that permeates the command-
and-control regulatory system, reformers argue that collaborative 
approaches “will mitigate conflict and lead to more effective, 
efficient, and flexible policy choices.”268  Instead of acting as 
adversaries, interested stakeholders—such as industry, government 
regulators, and non-governmental organizations—work as partners in 
decision-making on environmental policy and developing solutions to 
specific problems.269  Reform advocates hope that such alternative 
approaches would “take the confrontational edge off” the 1970s era 
command-and-control system,  produce more flexible, less costly 
regulations, and lead to improved monitoring and enforcement.270  
Example collaborative mechanisms include negotiated voluntary 
agreements and negotiated regulations. 
 
 262. Case, HPV Challenge Program, supra note 253, at 198; Coglianese & Nash, 
Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 63.  
 263. Case, HPV Challenge Program, supra note 253, at 198.  
 264. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 83.  
 265. Id. at 8–9.  
 266. Id. at 83.  
 267. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 379; Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, 
at 36–37.  
 268. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 379.  
 269. Id.; Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 36–37.  
 270. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 380; Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, 
at 36–37.  
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1. Negotiated Voluntary Agreements 
Negotiated voluntary agreements are created out of direct 
negotiation over specific environmental objectives between 
government authorities and a firm or industry group, though other 
stakeholders may also be involved.271  Negotiated agreements typically 
contain a specific environmental performance target and a timetable 
for attaining that target.272  Out of all the various types of voluntary 
environmental regulatory initiatives, negotiated agreements are most 
similar to regulation.273  A negotiated agreement is like regulation in 
that specific performance obligations are created that must be met by 
the industry party.274  Most negotiated voluntary agreements are 
nonbinding, although some, as was the case with EPA’s Project XL 
(described below), take the form of legally binding contracts.275  Even 
with nonbinding agreements, government authorities have a strong 
expectation of compliance by the industry party, and the agreement 
itself is commonly prompted by an express or implied threat of 
regulation or environmental taxation should the voluntary approach 
not succeed.276 
Negotiated voluntary agreements have been the focus of two 
noteworthy EPA programs, Project XL and the Common Sense 
Initiative (CSI).277  The CSI was one of EPA’s earliest regulatory 
“reinvention” programs, commencing in 1994 and roughly concluding 
by the end of the decade.278  The program involved direct negotiation 
with environmentally significant industries—metal finishing, 
computer and electronics, automobile manufacturing, printing, 
petroleum refining, and iron and steel—to develop voluntary 
agreements for integrated regulatory approaches for each industrial 
sector.279 
In contrast, “Project XL convene[d] stakeholders on a project-
by-project basis to negotiate alternative compliance plans to existing 
regulatory requirements for a single factory, community, or federal 
 
 271. Morgenstern & Pizer, Evaluating Voluntary Programs, supra note 231, at 4; Harrison, 
Voluntary Environmental Programs, supra note 224, at 264.   
 272. Morgenstern & Pizer, Evaluating Voluntary Programs, supra note 231, at 4.  
 273. Harrison, Voluntary Environmental Programs, supra note 224, at 264.  
 274. Id.; Mazurek, supra note 237, at 223.  
 275. Id.  
 276. Harrison, Voluntary Environmental Programs, supra note 224, at 264. 
 277. Mazurek, supra note 237, at 221.  
 278. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 41–43.  
 279. Id.; Mazurek, supra note 237, at 221.  
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facility.”280  This process resulted in a final project agreement between 
EPA and the firm sponsoring the project.281  Because firms received 
relief from existing laws and regulations in exchange for 
environmental performance achievements superior to regulatory 
mandates, certain portions of the agreement were legally binding.282  
The binding elements were generally included in a separate 
document, such as a permit, to ensure enforceability.283  The number 
of negotiated voluntary agreements that eventually resulted from the 
Project XL process is underwhelming.284  EPA accepted project 
proposals from 1995 until 2003 and ultimately reached agreement on 
only 50 projects.285 
2. Negotiated Regulations 
A key component of the Clinton Administration’s mid-1990s 
“regulatory reinvention” project was support for “negotiated 
rulemaking.”286  Following experiments with “negotiated rulemaking” 
during the 1970s and 1980s,287 Congress enacted the Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act in 1990.288  The law authorizes federal agencies to 
assemble with representatives of parties affected by a proposed 
regulation to negotiate an agreement on regulatory requirements 
before the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register.289  The 
statute does not mandate that agencies use negotiated regulation, but 
allows for the option at an agency’s discretion.290  The negotiated 
rulemaking process embraces the principles of collaborative 
regulatory approaches in order to develop improved rules, increase 
public acceptance, and minimize the probabilities of subsequent 
 
 280. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 43; Mazurek, supra note 237, at 221.  
 281. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 43.  
 282. Mazurek, supra note 237, at 223. 
 283. Id.  
 284. See Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 73 (stating 
“[b]y that time, [2003,] only about fifty regulated entities were fully participating in Project XL, 
considerably fewer than anticipated when the program was announced eight years earlier”). 
 285. Id. at 71–72.  
 286. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 406; see Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 
8, at 44–45 (describing and explaining “negotiated rulemaking” and its implementation).  
 287. See generally Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) [hereinafter Coglianese, Assessing 
Consensus] (assessing the effectiveness and value of negotiated rulemaking).  
 288. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 561–570a); Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 403.  
 289. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 404–05.  
 290. Id. at 404.  
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litigation.291 
EPA has utilized negotiated rulemaking more frequently than 
any other agency, primarily because the process can reduce agency 
resources devoted to administrative rulemaking and forestall related 
litigation.292  Even so, use of the negotiated rulemaking process is 
exceedingly rare.293  Further, studies suggest that claims that the 
process reduces the costs of rulemaking or attendant litigation rates 
may be illusory.294  Some experts thus question whether this 
mechanism is an effective alternative regulatory tool in the “next 
generation” toolkit.295  In fact, even EPA’s use of this mechanism has 
greatly diminished over the years, with only one negotiated 
rulemaking between 2001 and 2012, contrasted with eight uses 
between 1991 and 1992.296  Unless and until there is a return of 
enthusiasm and support for this approach, negotiated rulemaking 
cannot be considered a viable component of the next generation 
environmental regulatory reform movement.297 
V. CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION AND THE “LOST GENERATION” 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY REFORM 
The agenda of the “next generation” environmental regulatory 
reform movement has been equal parts optimistic and ambitious.  
The next generation agenda sought “to develop new strategies for 
attacking new environmental problems . . . to develop better 
strategies for solving old ones, and . . . to do both in ways that are 
more efficient, less taxing, and engender less political opposition.”298  
Ultimately, reformers sought new and better strategies for long-term, 
industry-wide alternatives to command-and-control regulation.299  In 
 
 291. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 44–45.  
 292. Id. at 45; KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 198.  
 293. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 198.  
 294. Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 287, at 1295–309; KLYZA & SOUSA, supra 
note 13, at 198–99.  
 295. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 198–99.  
 296. Id. at 309.  
 297. See id. (concluding that “[n]egotiated rulemaking is playing no significant role in a 
transformation to next generation rulemaking”).  
 298. Id. at 4–5 (quoting BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: A 
REPORT ON THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 6 (Donald F. Kettl ed., 
2002)).  
 299. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 4;  see also Coglianese & Nash, 
Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 24 (emphasizing EPA’s prediction that 
reform initiatives “would induce broader, systematic changes in the U.S. environmental 
regulatory system”).  
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the best-case scenario, environmental regulatory policy would 
undergo transformative reconstruction, with new statutes ushering in 
a new regulatory regime.300  To state the obvious, this has not 
happened.  To perhaps state the only slightly less obvious, the 
prospects that Congress will enact any such positive reform-minded 
environmental legislation in the foreseeable future appear 
nonexistent.301 
It is important to note that congressional gridlock on 
environmental policy has not completely prevented forward 
movement on environmental regulatory reform.302  To the contrary 
(as discussed in Section IV above) congressional inaction on 
environmental issues has led to substantial reform efforts undertaken 
primarily through EPA and other executive branch initiatives.303  
Disappointingly, however, despite decades of effort and resources 
devoted to such executive branch environmental regulatory reform or 
“reinvention” initiatives, the results are widely panned by researchers 
as having produced, at best, merely modest environmental benefits.304  
 
 300. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 225.  
 301. See supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.  
 302. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 2, 180 (discussing alternative pathways in which 
environmental policy is developing, including use of appropriations politics, executive-branch 
policymaking, judicial decisions, collaboration-based politics, and state-focused policymaking); 
Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 3, 34–35, 39 (describing Clinton era executive 
branch environmental reform initiatives designed to overcome Congressional gridlock on 
environmental reform); see also Andrews, supra note 2, at 242 (discussing the failure of 
Congress to enact legislation for additional alternative regulatory approaches after the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments leading to EPA “initiat[ing] a wide range of voluntary programs to 
promote and reward positive environmental initiatives and best practices by leading 
businesses”).  
 303. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 2, 180 (discussing alternative pathways in which 
environmental policy is developing, including use of appropriations politics, executive-branch 
policymaking, judicial decisions, collaboration-based politics, and state-focused policymaking); 
Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 3, 34–35, 39 (describing Clinton era executive 
branch environmental reform initiatives designed to overcome Congressional gridlock on 
environmental reform); see also Andrews, supra note 2, at 242 (discussing the failure of 
Congress to enact legislation for additional alternative regulatory approaches after the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments leading to EPA “initiat[ing] a wide range of voluntary programs to 
promote and reward positive environmental initiatives and best practices by leading 
businesses”).  
 304. See Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 4 (discussing the perception that 
EPA’s environmental reinvention effort “had foundered and the benefits of pursuing such 
efforts no longer exceeded their costs”); KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 205, 207, 225 
(describing the results of reinvention experimentation as “modest” and achieving “limited” or 
“little progress”); Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 64 
(characterizing Performance Track initiative as having “only the most modest overall impact on 
the nation’s environmental quality”); Steinzor, Reinventing Regulation, supra note 65, at 151 
(“None of the EPA’s reinvention initiatives has found significant new approaches, especially 
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Congress bears the lion’s share of responsibility for the failure of 
these experimental reform initiatives to live up to their promise.  
Indeed, 25 years, and counting, of congressional abdication of 
responsibility for the environmental regulatory system has created a 
“lost generation” of environmental regulatory reform.  Without 
Congress’ support and participation in these reform efforts, 
alternative regulatory approaches have been denied a full and fair 
opportunity to thrive and prosper despite two decades of exertion. 
Scholars frequently attribute the inefficacy of alternative 
programs to the lack of congressional support for environmental 
regulatory reform efforts through authorizing statutes.305  For 
example, cornerstone Clinton era reinvention programs such as 
Project XL and the CSI were seriously hindered by substantial 
concerns over whether EPA had the legal authority to grant the 
waivers of statutory and regulatory requirements both experimental 
programs anticipated.306  The possibility that collaboratively 
negotiated agreements might be subsequently challenged by citizen 
suits due to a lack of statutory authorization led to risk-averse 
behavior by both EPA and participating industries and firms.307  
Instead of dramatic experiments and bold, risk-taking innovation, CSI 
and XL projects typically defaulted to “peripheral matters” and 
 
ones that can be applied on an industry-wide basis.”); David B. Spence & Lekha 
Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory & Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient 
Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 601 (2000) (observing that “[m]any of [EPA’s] reinvention 
programs have stalled or failed to meet expectations”); Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs 
Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 734 (describing modest environmental benefits demonstrated 
by public voluntary environmental programs); Richard D. Morgenstern & William A. Pizer, 
Concluding Observations: What Can We Learn from the Case Studies?, in REALITY CHECK: THE 
NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN 166, 184 (Richard D. Morgenstern & William A. Pizer eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter, Morgenstern & Pizer, Case Studies] (concluding from review of research on 
voluntary environmental programs that environmental gains were limited and none of the case 
studies “found truly convincing evidence of dramatic environmental improvements”); Darnall & 
Sides, supra note 13, at 110 (concluding that “little evidence” existed that overall participation 
in voluntary environmental programs “is associated with improved environmental 
performance”).  
 305. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 53; Andrews, supra note 2, at 258; 
see, e.g., Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 419–21 (noting that both the CSI and XL programs 
were “plagued by uncertainty about whether the EPA had the authority to grant the waivers of 
statutory and regulatory requirements anticipated by the programs,” which a gridlocked 
Congress failed to address); KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 10 (stating that “the absence of 
congressional sanction has decisively limited the advance of next generation reforms”).  
 306. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 419–20; Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 
8, at 53–55.  
 307. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 419–20; Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 
8, at 53–55.  
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modest ideas already permissible under the existing regulatory 
system.308 
Thus, limited results and modest environmental improvements 
flowing from these initiatives may have been inevitable.  A 
fundamental disconnect exists when reform programs ostensibly 
designed to promote innovative, alternative approaches to traditional 
regulation imagine a level of regulatory flexibility that Congress has 
not authorized.309  As Sousa and Klyza aptly observe, these 
“regulatory reform initiatives were undertaken in part because 
Congress had been unable to fix many problems in the regulatory 
system due to gridlock [y]et the progress of those initiatives was 
limited by the very gridlock that motivated them.”310  In other words, 
a vicious circle exists between Congress abdicating its responsibility 
to improve, modernize, and reform the system and the potential for 
success of extra-congressional reform initiatives attempting to do just 
that.  To the extent these reform experiments experienced poor or 
lackluster performance, Congress’ failure to support them through 
authorizing legislation was a significant contributing factor.311 
Congress’ failure to support regulatory reform efforts over the 
years extends well beyond its refusal to enact authorizing legislation 
for such efforts.  Congress has a lengthy history of drastically 
underfunding EPA, resulting in large disparities between the agency’s 
copious legislative mandates and its program and enforcement 
budgets.312  Thus, the agency has long been required to implement and 
pursue regulatory reform initiatives with few resources beyond the 
already-insufficient resources available to accommodate traditional 
regulatory responsibilities.313 
 
 308. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 55; Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 
420; NAPA, RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 134, at 212.  
 309. Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and 
Implementing Environmental and Occupational Safety and Health Policy, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 141, 183 (1999). 
 310. Sousa & Klyza, supra note 107, at 420.  
 311. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 10 (stating that “the absence of congressional 
sanction has decisively limited the advance of next generation reforms”).  
 312. See Mintz, supra note 63, at 7–10 (acknowledging that EPA’s budget has been 
significantly capped by Congress despite “a considerable growth of the Agency’s 
responsibilities”); Andrews, supra note 2, at 255 (“There has been a large disparity between 
EPA’s mandates and its funding.”); Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2393–94 (noting that “the federal 
budget for EPA enforcement [has] been diminished”); Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, 
supra note 113, at 82 (stating that EPA is responsible for “overwhelming statutory mandates” 
despite its “grossly insufficient resources”).  
 313. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 57–58.  
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In a recent example, concern over scarce resources may have 
been a significant factor in the Obama administration EPA’s decision 
to end the Performance Track and Climate Leaders programs.314  
Prior to these cancellations, agency staff expressed the view that 
voluntary environmental programs deprived traditional regulatory 
programs of necessary funds, so, in an environment of scarce 
resources, the choice should be made to shift available resources 
away from voluntary initiatives.315  Critics had long expressed similar 
concern that voluntary programs distract focus and resources from 
governmental responsibility to ensure industry compliance with 
mandatory regulatory obligations.316  These critics advocated that 
funding for voluntary programs should be redirected to managing 
traditional regulatory programs, especially in light of empirical 
studies suggesting that voluntary initiatives have limited 
environmental performance impacts.317 
Fiscal dilemmas that force agency decisions to end regulatory 
reform programs or, alternatively, to provide merely minimal 
commitment to such initiatives, are congressionally imposed obstacles 
to the potential success of reform efforts.  Most certainly, Congress’ 
failure to support environmental regulatory reform programs by 
refusing to provide adequate resources for ongoing initiatives does 
not improve the chances for these programs to produce useful results.  
Many critics argue that Congress must lead in creating a climate for 
innovation, experimentation, and risk-taking for regulatory reform 
efforts to have any realistic chance of success.318  Starving regulatory 
reform efforts by imposing severe budget constraints on EPA only 
ensures that the reverse is true.  Thus, the failure to fiscally support 
reform initiatives must be considered one of Congress’ substantial 
contributions to the “lost generation” of environmental regulatory 
reform.  Prospects for robust and meaningful results from 
experimentation with regulatory reform programs have been 
squandered by many years of congressional inaction. 
The past few decades of congressional abdication have further 
ensured that these “next generation” environmental reform efforts 
 
 314. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 34.  
 315. Id. 
 316. Darnall & Sides, supra note 13, at 97.  
 317. Id.  
 318. Case, Regulatory Reform Agenda, supra note 8, at 55; see also KLYZA & SOUSA, supra 
note 13, at 14 (discussing the difficulty of achieving environmental regulatory reform “without 
congressional sanction” and that next generation reformers “needed the stamp of legitimacy on 
their experiments that only statutory language could provide”). 
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operated under an almost exclusively voluntary framework.  
However, the use of voluntary approaches as the sole means to 
accomplish regulatory reform goals is inherently limited.  Most 
notably, voluntary environmental regulatory initiatives have limited 
impacts because of their consistently low participation rates.  Studies 
show that only a relatively small proportion of firms in the United 
States actually participate in voluntary environmental initiatives.319  
Early EPA public voluntary programs such as the 33/50 program, 
Project XL, and the Common Sense Initiative were widely criticized 
for low participation.320  More recent EPA voluntary programs, such 
as Climate Wise and the National Environmental Performance Track, 
were similarly criticized for low participation rates.321  For example, 
although 500 industrial facilities participated in Performance Track at 
any given time, a recent study of the program noted that this number 
represented a tiny fraction of facilities potentially eligible to apply.322 
Low participation in voluntary environmental programs is 
attributed to insufficient inducements to encourage industry 
participation and disincentives that cause firms to consider 
participation undesirable.323  For example, EPA’s notoriously 
underperforming Climate Wise program has been strongly criticized 
for relatively weak participation incentives.324  Using an effective 
combination of “carrots and sticks” to attract increased participation 
may significantly improve a voluntary program’s overall impact.325  
Scholars consider a program’s overall impact to be the product of the 
total number of participants and the effectiveness per participant.326  
Minimal participation in EPA’s voluntary programs strongly 
contributes to the perception that these programs have led to, at best, 
 
 319. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 99.  However, contrast low 
participation in EPA voluntary programs to participation in similar types of voluntary initiatives 
in the United Kingdom and Japan, which are noted to have had “almost universal 
participation.”  Morgenstern & Pizer, Case Studies, supra note 304, at 179.  
 320. Case, HPV Challenge Program, supra note 253, at 198.  
 321. Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 733; 
Morgenstern & Pizer, Case Studies, supra note 304, at 179.  
 322. Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem, supra note 151, at 63; see also 
CARY COGLIANESE & JENNIFER NASH, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS DECISION MAKING 
AND THE US EPA’S PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM 3 (2006); Case, Changing Corporate 
Behavior, supra note 113, at 99.  
 323. Case, HPV Challenge Program, supra note 253, at 198 & n.309; Morgenstern & Pizer, 
Case Studies, supra note 304, at 179; Mazurek, supra note 237, at 224.  
 324. Morgenstern & Pizer, Case Studies, supra note 304, at 179.  
 325. Id. at 181.  
 326. Id.  
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lackluster environmental results.327 
Scholars further argue that the typical political origins of 
voluntary initiatives should diminish expectations that such programs 
can have substantial environmental performance impacts.328  Lyon and 
Maxwell assert that public voluntary programs “are generally weak 
tools adopted when the political will to take stronger action is 
missing.”329  That is, voluntary programs are utilized specifically 
because the agency lacks statutory authority to regulate more 
stringently.330  Because voluntary programs are often created out of 
political weakness rather than strength, there is little reason to 
anticipate that they will produce significant impacts.331 
Similarly, EPA’s reliance on voluntary regulatory initiatives can 
be attributed to a lack of “regulatory momentum” and government 
retreat from its traditional environmental policy leadership role as 
regulatory authority in the industrial sector.332  In this regard, 
voluntary environmental initiatives are asserted to undercut 
governmental resolve to establish more substantial and progressive 
environmental protection schemes in the regulatory sphere.333  
Indeed, environmentalists long believed that the George W. Bush 
administration “used voluntary programs as an excuse not to regulate 
and as an active tool to subvert regulations.”334 
Scholars have debated the merits of employing voluntary versus 
mandatory approaches in environmental regulatory reform efforts.335  
 
 327. Case, HPV Challenge Program, supra note 253, at 198; see also Stewart, New 
Generation, supra note 119, at 132 (observing that “large numbers of non-mandated 
environmental improvements are unlikely to be pursued under . . . an incentive system” based 
solely on self-regulatory, voluntary environmental initiatives). 
 328. Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 745.  
 329. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Public Voluntary Programmes for Mitigating 
Climate Change, in VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN CLIMATE POLICY 134–35 (Andrea Baranzini 
& Philippe Thalmann eds., 2004).  
 330. Id. at 134.  
 331. Lyon & Maxwell, Voluntary Programs Reconsidered, supra note 236, at 745.  
 332. Paul Muldoon & Ramani Nadarajah, A Sober Second Look, in VOLUNTARY 
INITIATIVES: THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING 51, 53, 54 (Robert B. Gibson ed., 
1999).  
 333. Id. at 59.  
 334. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 310.  
 335. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 110; see Case, Corporate 
Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 439 (noting differing views regarding voluntary 
information disclosure initiatives and proponents of mandatory information disclosure 
mechanisms); Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 110–11 (advocating 
mandatory approaches to self-management regulatory reform strategies over voluntary 
initiatives); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 
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Strategies that implement mandatory regulatory reform mechanisms 
would overcome many of the weaknesses of voluntary environmental 
initiatives.  For example, mandatory regulatory strategies would 
overcome firms’ disincentives against participating in voluntary 
programs and thus the consistent problem of extremely inadequate 
participation rates in such initiatives.336  Further, mandatory programs 
would allow specific targeting of industry populations or sectors for 
which certain alternative regulatory approaches are particularly well-
suited or could address particularly challenging problems.337  
However, to the extent that mandatory environmental regulatory 
reform mechanisms would produce superior environmental policy 
benefits over voluntary approaches, this cannot occur without 
legislation from Congress authorizing agencies to deploy mandatory 
alternative regulatory tools.338  To achieve significant, badly needed, 
 
511–23 (2003) (comparing relative strengths and weaknesses of voluntary and mandatory EMS-
based self-regulatory mechanisms); Josephine Maltby, Setting Its Own Standards and Meeting 
Those Standards: Volunteerism Versus Regulation in Environmental Reporting, 6 BUS. 
STRATEGY & THE ENV’T 83, 89–91 (1997) (discussing the dispute between supporters of 
voluntary approaches to environmental information disclosure and those favoring mandatory 
approaches); Sonja Gallhofer & Jim Haslam, The Direction of Green Accounting Policy: Critical 
Reflections, 10 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 148, 149–65 (1997) (contrasting 
support for voluntary approaches to environmental information disclosure to a critical 
theoretical justification for a mandatory regulatory approach).  
 336. See Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 110–11 (“[A] mandatory 
approach to EMS implementation in certain circumstances may offer advantages over voluntary 
programs.”); Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 439–42 (describing 
how mandatory programs would overcome the disincentives commonly associated with 
voluntary programs). 
 337. See Wendy E. Wagner, Imagining Corporate Sustainability as a Public Good Rather 
Than a Corporate Bad, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561, 562, 579–88 (2011) (advocating 
mandatory information disclosure as an alternative regulatory approach under an information 
as a public good analysis); Joey Tsu-Yi Chen, Green Sox for Investors: Requiring Companies to 
Disclose Risks Related to Climate Change, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 325, 354–56 (2010) (advocating a 
mandatory approach to informational regulation in the context of requiring disclosure of 
corporate data relative to climate risks); Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 113, at 
110 (advocating a mandatory approach in the context of self-management regulatory strategies 
involving implementation of corporate environmental management systems); Case, Corporate 
Environmental Reporting, supra note 103, at 439–42 (advocating a mandatory, rather than 
voluntary approach to informational regulatory strategies in the context of mandatory corporate 
environmental reporting requirements); Andrew Schatz, Regulating Greenhouse Gases by 
Mandatory Information Disclosure, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 392–93 (2008) (arguing for 
mandatory information disclosure programs as a regulatory approach for achieving reductions 
of greenhouse gas emissions).  
 338. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 255–56 (“EPA’s most serious unsolved problems and 
deficiencies are congressionally imposed: they cannot be solved without congressional will to 
pursue a greener economy, both by deploying market-oriented regulatory tools and removing . . 
. incentives that continue to protect environmentally damaging--and economically 
anachronistic--practices of an earlier era.”).  
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wide-reaching environmental policy reform using innovative and 
flexible tools—such as market-based incentives and self-regulatory 
mechanisms—statutory authority is needed.339  This would necessarily 
require an end to decades of congressional abdication regarding 
environment policy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Existing political gridlock in Congress suggests that 
comprehensive, legislative reforms of the federal environmental 
regulatory system are, to say the least, wildly improbable.340  The 
forecasts of commentators for a potential end to gridlock and political 
polarization in Congress, particularly on environmental issues, are 
decidedly negative.341  The 2010 congressional mid-term elections 
during President Obama’s first term ushered in a period of extreme 
partisanship that finds the major political parties “more polarized 
than they have been in 120 years.”342  The 112th Congress (2011-12) 
was characterized at the time as “the most dysfunctional Congress of 
the past forty years.”343  Legislative productivity in the 112th Congress 
was also at its lowest point in modern history, and the 113th Congress 
(2013-14) is on track to accomplish even less.344 
Political scientists and other policy analysts examining the root 
causes of the growing dysfunction in Congress place considerable, but 
certainly not all, of the blame on conservative Republicans and the 
 
 339. Id. at 258; see also KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 14 (“[W]ithout new statutes . . . it 
will be difficult to push ahead with even the tinkering and pragmatic adjustment that the next 
generation of environmental policy requires.”).  
 340. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 255 (“For the present, it is clear that any hope of 
significant environmental policy reform in Congress continues to be held hostage to bitter 
partisan gridlock.”).  
 341. See id.; Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2325, 2366–71 (stating that “[t]he bitterly partisan 
nature of environmental issues in Congress today suggests that comprehensive, thoughtful 
reforms tailored to the problems faced by modern society are unlikely”); Aagaard, supra note 5, 
at 1282 (stating that “the current political context is highly inhospitable to the enactment of 
major environmental lawmaking”).  
 342. KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 285–86.  
 343. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2370; see also Sarah Binder, Polarized We Govern? (Center 
for Effective Public Management at Brookings Working Paper, May 2014), at 2 (copy on file 
with author) (“At the close of the 112th Congress in early January 2013, numerous Washington 
observers charged that the 112th Congress was the most dysfunctional Congress ever.”).  
 344. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2368; Drew Desilver, Congress Continues its Streak of Passing 
Few Significant Laws, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 31, 2014), available at http://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/31/congress-continues-its-streak-of-passing-few-significant-
laws/.  
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Tea Party’s rise.345  Simply because environmental gridlock and 
legislative stalemates currently prevail in Congress does not mean 
that this long-term status quo will inevitably continue.  A future shift 
in Congress toward a unified Republican government could very well 
herald a return to the divisive battles over federal environmental 
regulation that were prevalent in the early 1980s and mid-1990s.  In 
that event, a drive to dismantle substantial portions of the regulatory 
system, rather than effect positive-minded reform of federal 
environmental regulation, would be the most likely battleground.346 
Despite this gloomy outlook, commentators nonetheless express 
optimism that progress on currently unregulated or under-regulated 
environmental protection problems can continue to be made without 
Congress, solely by way of continuing executive branch initiatives.347  
Sandra Zellmer identifies a number of possibilities for the executive 
branch to act on environmental issues despite congressional 
unwillingness to institute legislative reform, such as “invigorating 
citizens’ petitions for rulemaking; placing greater reliance on 
executive orders that prioritize public health and environmental 
protection; and stepping up environmental enforcement efforts.”348  
Pursuing such “second best” strategies would allow executive branch 
policymakers and environmental advocates to make at least limited 
progress while awaiting the perhaps unattainable dream of the “first 
best” option of comprehensive congressional reforms.349 
Such executive branch initiatives are indeed worthwhile avenues 
 
 345. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 285–87 (noting that “Congressional polarization 
has been ‘asymmetric,’ driven more by the sharp movement of Republicans to the right than 
Democratic movement to the left, and it has been accompanied by an erosion of congressional 
norms of civility, breathtaking forms of brinksmanship, . . . and unprecedented uses of the 
Senate filibuster to block action by the majority”); Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2369–70 (stating 
that “the inability to get things done is a reflection of divided government”).  See generally 
Morris P. Fiorina, America’s Polarized Politics: Causes and Solutions, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 852 
(2013); Justin Grimmer, Appropriators not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral 
Incentives on Congressional Representation, 57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 624 (2013); Ashley E. Jochim 
& Bryan D. Jones, Issue Politics in a Polarized Congress, 66 POL. RES. Q. 352 (2012). 
 346. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 316–17 (“[I]t is possible that under a unified 
Republican government, a rollback of basic environmental laws . . . could occur.”); Zellmer, 
supra note 3, at 2325, 2379–80 (noting that, for example, in the 112th Congress, dominated by a 
Republican majority, “the top priorities of the House Energy and Commerce Committee 
included rolling back the EPA’s ‘regulatory choke hold’”).  
 347. See Zellmer, supra note 3, at 2384, 2398 (“While Congress has been neglectful, the 
federal agencies have taken up the slack in some instances, crafting more innovative and, in 
some cases, more progressive solutions than might be expected in Congress.”).  
 348. Id. at 2398.  
 349. Id.  
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of pursuit, but even aggressive and progressive action in this regard 
has inherent limitations given how intensely polarized the current 
political climate remains.350  Pursuing improvements and reforms 
solely through executive branch initiatives, as has been the case since 
the 1990s, is likely to continue to produce, at best, extremely marginal 
benefits.  Executive branch policymaking is preferable to no action at 
all, but it will also indefinitely extend the “lost generation” of 
environmental regulatory reform that has persisted for the last 25 
years. 
For more substantively meaningful and effective environmental 
regulatory reform to occur, congressional abdication must end.  
Congress should again take up the primary role in environmental 
policymaking that it occupied during the 1970s and, somewhat more 
sporadically, in the 1980s.351  As the primary policymaker, Congress 
must accept the challenge repeatedly laid out during the past two 
decades by reform advocates to find the best tools to meet each 
environmental challenge.352  For some problems, the best alternative 
will be to continue using traditional environmental regulatory 
approaches.353  For others, “next generation” alternative regulatory 
mechanisms will be a more efficient, effective, and desirable 
strategy.354 
Although it seems naïve to hold out such hope, what seems 
necessary is another “republican moment” of political consensus and 
congressional will to improve and modernize the environmental 
regulatory system.355  From a political standpoint, environmental 
regulatory reform accomplished through legislative action would have 
more legitimacy than unilateral executive branch initiatives.356  
 
 350. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 315–16 (noting that “significant change is 
unlikely” due to significant political polarization).  
 351. See Jeffrey Rudd, J.B. Ruhl’s “Law-and-Society System”: Burying Norms and 
Democracy Under Complexity Theory’s Foundation, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
551, 556 (2005) [hereinafter Rudd] (calling on Congress to “become more proactive in 
environmental matters critical to advancing the public’s interests”). 
 352. Coglianese, Managerial Turn, supra note 214, at 73. 
 353. Id.  
 354. Id. at 73–74; Andrews, supra note 2, at 225 (“Both the economy and the environment 
could be better served by policy innovations that would promote more integrated solutions, 
more self-enforcing incentives, and more rigorous, yet more stable, environmental performance 
expectations.”).  
 355. See Lazarus, supra note 59, at 999 (defining “republican moment” as an “‘outburst[] of 
democratic participation and ideological politics’”) (citations omitted).   
 356. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 13, at 31 (“[A]rguably the legislative process provides 
greater accountability and holds greater legitimacy than policymaking on the pathways that 
have become so crucial in environmental policymaking.”); Rudd, supra note 351, at 557 
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Legislative action would also have a far greater probability of 
achieving meaningful environmental protection gains at the level 
envisioned by “next generation” reform advocates.  Congress’ 
abdication of responsibility for the environmental regulatory system 
over the past quarter of a century is a serious threat to critical 
national interests in appropriately addressing a myriad of ongoing 
environmental protection challenges. 
 
(“Democratic principles should guide efforts to improve the quality of the environmental 
regulatory system and its decision-making organizations.”); Harris, supra note 88, at 374 
(“[L]egislative action is a trustworthier, democratic process; unilateral executive action is not.”). 
